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Individuals often utilize distraction strategies to cope with distress that results from 
anxiety-provoking situations.  While some theories suggest that distraction will impede 
improvement during exposure, others suggest it may not be harmful, and may in fact aid in fear 
reduction.  Experimental results parallel these divergent theories, with support for distraction 
both helping and hindering treatment.  Given these mixed findings, the goal of these studies was 
to investigate factors that may help explain the differences observed in the extant literature.  In 
Study 1 a measure of maladaptive beliefs about distraction, the Beliefs about Distraction 
Inventory (BADI), was developed and validated in an unselected student sample (N = 506) and 
confirmed in a contamination-fearful sample (N = 132).  Results indicated that the BADI was 
psychometrically sound and consisted of two factors: Distraction is Necessary and Distraction is 
Effective.  This factor structure was confirmed in the contamination-fearful sample, and similar 
psychometric properties were observed.  Study 2 was comprised of two studies that together 
aimed to assess the impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome.  In Experiment 
1 verbal distraction tasks were experimentally validated in an undergraduate sample (N = 180) 
using a reaction time task.  Three different levels of distraction were established, categorized as 
utilizing low, moderate, and high levels of cognitive load.  In Experiment 2 the three tasks 
varying in distraction intensity were compared to a no distraction control during an exposure 
session with contamination-fearful individuals (N = 124).  Changes in behavioural approach did 
not differ significantly across conditions at post-exposure or at one-week follow-up.  However, 
treatment acceptability was highest in conditions utilizing moderate or high levels of distraction, 
and changes in self-efficacy were greatest in the moderate distraction condition.  Finally, 
preliminary analyses were conducted to assess the impact of maladaptive beliefs about 
distraction on exposure outcome.  Results showed that high BADI scores were related to less 





The results of these studies are discussed in terms of theoretical and clinical implications, 
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 With lifetime prevalence rates estimated at 29% (Kessler et al., 2005), anxiety disorders 
are among the most common mental disorders.  Not only are anxiety disorders common, but they 
are also often debilitating, resulting in markedly decreased quality of life and reduced 
psychosocial functioning (e.g., Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000; Olatunji, Cisler, & Tolin, 2007; 
Rapaport, Clary, Fayyad, & Endicott, 2005).  Additionally, significant impairment in daily 
functioning has been observed even in individuals with subclinical levels of anxiety 
(Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000), further highlighting the impact of anxiety symptoms on everyday 
life.  Fortunately, a number of effective treatments for anxiety disorders exist.  For example, 
cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) has been well-established as an effective evidence-based 
treatment for anxiety disorders (e.g., Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Hofmann & 
Smits, 2008) that has been shown to be more effective than psychotropic medication (e.g., 
Hofmann & Smits, 2008).  Most cognitive-behavioural treatments involve at least some 
component of exposure, where individuals confront situations or stimuli that cause them anxiety; 
however, there is ongoing debate about how best to implement exposure in treatment.  For 
example, the importance of focused attention (versus distraction), dropping safety behaviours, 
experiencing significant fear reduction, and sequentially progressing through a hierarchy of 
feared situations have all received recent attention (e.g., Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & 
Vervliet, 2014; Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; Podină, Koster, Philippot, Dethier, & David, 
2013).  The current research program focused on the use of distraction during exposure.  
Specifically, the impact of distraction use was examined in the context of both exposure outcome 
and treatment acceptability. 
Individuals often resort to the use of distraction strategies in order to cope with negative 
emotions including anxiety (e.g., Werner & Gross, 2010; Rothbart & Sheese, 2007), one of many 
emotion regulation skills that are acquired early in development (Kopp, 1989).  Distraction has 
been conceptualized as any action that removes attentional focus from the experience of anxiety 
or from the stimulus or situation that is causing anxiety (e.g., Sy, Dixon, Lickel, Nelson, & 
Deacon, 2011), thus acting as a form of escape or avoidance.  Distraction can take many forms 
which can be classified more generally as either visual or cognitive distraction or more 





or making lists), including inward versus outward distraction (see Podină et al., 2013).  Although 
distraction exists in many forms, the typical function of utilizing distraction relates to reducing 
negative emotions such as depression, disgust, guilt, and anxiety (see Werner & Gross, 2010).  
However, the current research program focuses on the use of distraction in the context of 
anxiety.  Given that distracting oneself may lead to reduced attention allocated to the anxiety-
provoking stimulus or situation in addition to reduced anxiety, its use in the context of exposure 
therapy for anxiety has received scientific scrutiny. 
 Exposure is an effective component of cognitive-behaviour therapy based on behavioural 
theory which involves repeated and prolonged exposure to feared objects or situations (e.g., 
Abramowitz, Deacon, & Whiteside, 2011).  When individuals stay in the presence of something 
that makes them anxious and do so repeatedly, they learn that the outcome they fear does not 
occur, which leads to subsequent decreases in anxiety and fear.  Initial conceptualizations of 
exposure were based on habituation/extinction models: when exposed to feared stimuli that are 
objectively safe, an initial increase in anxiety will be followed by a gradual decrease in anxiety, 
with repeated trials leading to lower initial levels and more rapid reduction of anxiety (e.g., 
Groves & Thompson, 1970; Rachman, de Silva, & Roper, 1976; Soloman, Kamin, & Wynne, 
1953).  Early work on the use of exposure in the treatment of anxiety disorders focused on 
systematic desensitization, which involved imaginal exposure to feared stimuli while 
concurrently experiencing a state of relaxation, purportedly leading to reciprocal inhibition 
(Wolpe, 1958).  Habituation-based models without the use of relaxation later became the 
dominant mechanism proposed to drive exposure therapy (e.g., Lader & Mathews, 1968; Watts, 
1979).  For example, in experimental work by Meyer (1966), individuals with obsessive-
compulsive disorder were exposed to their fears and then prevented from completing their 
typical compulsions (i.e., exposure and response prevention) with the goal of modifying 
expectations of danger.  This habituation-based treatment required patients to sit with their 
anxiety until it subsided, without taking specific actions to reduce their anxiety, and without the 
use of relaxation strategies that had been incorporated in earlier exposure-based treatments.  
Following Meyer’s work, the use of exposure for a broad range of anxiety-related difficulties 
continued and has been developed further over time (see Rachman, 2015). 
While exposure had often been viewed as a behavioural treatment primarily based on fear 





Salkovskis, 1985).  Cognitive theories have further proposed fear disconfirmation as an 
important mechanism in exposure (e.g., Clark, 1999; Salkovskis, 1991).  Therefore, exposure 
likely works via both cognitive and behavioural mechanisms.  However, given the proposed 
importance of the experience of anxious arousal (and reductions in anxiety) in successful 
exposure (as outlined by behavioural theory), the use of distraction during exposure is often 
discouraged. 
 One theory suggesting that the use of distraction may interfere with treatment is that of 
emotional processing.  Although the term “emotional processing” was first utilized by Rachman 
(1980), it followed work by Lang (1977, 1979) that proposed a model for how emotional 
information is stored, processed, and organized, including the presence of fear structures (later 
expanded by Foa & Kozak, 1986; see below).  Emotional processing refers to experiencing an 
emotional disturbance and successfully “absorbing” this experience in a manner that does not 
impact future behaviour or negatively colour future experiences (Rachman, 1980).  Accordingly, 
a failure to adequately process a troubling event during or after its occurrence is proposed to lead 
to emotional difficulties.  It is suggested that successful therapy must incorporate proper 
emotional processing, such that fear-related cues no longer elicit a fearful reaction.  Given that 
this theory focuses on the importance of experiencing emotional arousal, emotional processing is 
thought to be stunted by stimulus avoidance or a lack of autonomic response.  Distraction 
techniques that reduce or remove focus from the feared stimulus or are effective in reducing 
autonomic response are therefore seen as impediments to successful emotional processing.  
Accordingly, the recommendation put forth by Rachman (1980) states that minimizing 
distractions will promote ample emotional processing. 
The emotional processing theory was extended by Foa and Kozak (1986) to address 
potential mechanisms related to fear processing.  They proposed that fear is represented in 
memory structures that influence fear-related behaviour, and that therapy can aid in altering or 
modifying these memory structures.  Specifically, in order for fear reduction to occur during 
exposure, the relevant fear structure must be activated and then altered through integration of 
new information that is incompatible with the existing fear structure content.  Foa and Kozak 
(1986) emphasize the importance of physiological arousal during exposure and suggest that 
cognitive avoidance (i.e., distraction) will interfere with this process by decreasing encoding and 





experience is recommended for optimal fear reduction, and that distraction does not allow for 
full immersion to occur.   
Others have postulated that an important factor for fear reduction is attentional focus.  
Early research on desensitization (which involves imagining feared objects or scenes) found that 
re-describing the object or scene during each exposure (i.e., re-focusing attention on the details) 
was more effective in reducing return of fear than simply asking individuals to re-imagine the 
object or scene (Watts, 1974).  It has similarly been suggested that active engagement with a 
stimulus during exposure is a necessary condition for extinction (Borkovec, 1982), and that 
insufficient attentional focus will interfere with emotional processing during exposure (Barlow, 
1988).  Importantly, Borkovec and Grayson (1980) noted that exposure to a stimulus does not 
necessarily mean that functional exposure has occurred (i.e., attention to the stimulus is also 
necessary).  This proposed distinction is important because individuals may theoretically 
complete an exposure exercise but not be completely immersed in the experience due to a lack of 
attention, which may lead to reduced improvement in treatment.  In summary, attention, and 
more specifically cognitive attention or a focus on the details of a feared situation or stimulus, 
has been suggested as an important and optimal condition for fear reduction.  Consequently, any 
action that interferes with these conditions is proposed to negatively impact fear reduction (e.g., 
Watts, 1974).  
Another theory that has proposed negative implications for distraction use is the 
inhibitory learning theory put forth by Craske and colleagues (e.g., Craske et al., 2008; Craske, 
Liao, Brown, & Vervliet, 2012; Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014).  
Inhibitory learning theory suggests that previous associations between stimuli and fearful 
reactions do not necessarily need to be altered (as suggested by emotional processing theory), but 
instead new associations need to be built that will compete with pre-existing memories (e.g., 
Craske et al., 2008; Craske et al, 2012; Craske et al., 2014).  As these new associations are 
learned in a number of contexts and spaced over time, they will be more easily retrieved than 
former fear-related associations, thus leading to decreased fear (e.g., Craske et al., 2008).  In 
order for inhibitory learning (also referred to as “safety learning”) to occur, new associations 
need to be learned in conditions where “conditioned inhibitors” (i.e., actions that are taken to 
achieve safety in a situation) are not utilized.  For example, if an individual performs specific 





using hand sanitizer, any new associations that are created will include this “conditioned 
inhibitor” as a safety signal, and thus will not allow learning that can effectively counteract the 
initial fear association (Craske et al., 2008).  This could theoretically relate to distraction if the 
lack of a negative outcome is attributed to the use of distraction.  More importantly, it is 
proposed that awareness of both the feared stimulus and the non-occurrence of a feared outcome 
(or fear response) are required for inhibitory learning to occur; therefore, distraction is 
considered harmful due to reduced ability to attend to the potentially absent link between a 
feared stimulus and a feared outcome or fear response (Craske et al., 2014).  Consequently, it is 
suggested that distraction interferes with inhibitory learning and should be discouraged during 
exposure. 
In line with the aforementioned theories, it is often suggested that clients refrain from 
utilizing distraction techniques in the context of treatment.  This suggestion reflects the proposal 
that distraction impedes progress during exposure (e.g., Clark et al., 2006; Foa & Kozak, 1986) 
and that distraction amplifies the probability of the return of fear (e.g., Boschen, Neumann, & 
Waters, 2009).  On the other hand, distraction strategies are often encouraged and implemented 
in clinical practice to help individuals more easily approach feared situations or stimuli (e.g., 
Craske, Street, & Barlow, 1989; Salkovskis, 1991).  In addition to the fact that distraction is 
often encouraged in clinical practice, many individuals without diagnosable anxiety disorders use 
strategies such as distraction to cope with the occurrence of anxiety (or other negative emotions), 
an adaptive response that does not appear to lead to negative long term consequences or 
difficulties unless it becomes chronic (e.g., Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Hunt, 1998).  This 
further suggests that the use of such techniques may not inherently lead to negative 
consequences, but that there may be specific elements of anxiety control strategies that are 
important to consider in clinically anxious individuals (e.g., Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008). 
Salkovskis (1991) emphasized that continual avoidance of or escape from anxiety-
provoking situations results in an inability to disconfirm threat-related fears, acting as a 
maintenance factor for anxiety disorders.  Specifically, actions aimed to prevent feared 
catastrophic outcomes do not allow individuals to learn about the actual safety of the situations 
or stimuli they encounter, as safety is often attributed to these actions (e.g., Clark, 1999; 
Salkovskis, 1991).  While Salkovskis (1991) suggests that such safety-seeking behaviours 





effects when the intention of the behaviour is to prevent disastrous outcomes.  It is thus proposed 
that adaptive coping-related responses that aim to reduce anxiety in a situation do not follow this 
pattern (Salkovskis, 1991; Salkovskis, Clark, & Gelder, 1996): they are not performed to prevent 
catastrophic outcomes, and thus do not necessarily prevent fear disconfirmation.  Of course, it is 
possible that in cases where physiological arousal is the fear (e.g., in individuals with panic 
disorder), distraction may in fact be aimed at preventing negative outcomes, and thus may be 
considered detrimental to treatment.  However, given that in most cases distraction does not 
primarily serve as a means to prevent negative outcomes but rather aims to reduce anxious 
arousal, it is not predicted that distraction will necessarily interfere with fear reduction.  Indeed, 
it has been suggested that the feared outcome an individual is avoiding, and thus the intention 
behind the use of anxiety-reducing strategies, may be a more important consideration than 
simply whether such techniques are employed.  Furthermore, the use of anxiety reduction 
techniques may in fact aid in cognitive change given that the use of these strategies often allows 
for the occurrence of non-catastrophic outcomes (e.g., Salkovskis, Clark, Hackmann, Wells, & 
Gelder, 1999).  This cognitive perspective supports the notion that distraction may not in fact 
impede improvement during exposure.  However, this also raises the important question of how 
to accurately distinguish between adaptive coping and maladaptive avoidance (e.g., Thwaites & 
Freeston, 2005).   
Distraction strategies specifically aimed at controlling anxiety have been utilized in the 
context of anxiety management treatments (i.e., encouraged in some clinical contexts), yet have 
alternatively been labeled as problematic behaviour that needs to be reduced in the context of 
treatment, a puzzling discrepancy that has raised theoretical questions (e.g., Parrish, Radomsky, 
& Dugas, 2008; Salkovskis, 1991, 1996).  Specifically, it is curious that the same action can be 
conceptualized as helpful by some, and alternatively viewed as an avoidance strategy that needs 
to be eliminated by others.  One potentially important factor relates to understanding the purpose 
or function a specific strategy is serving; it has been suggested that this distinction may aid in 
distinguishing between adaptive and maladaptive strategies.  Specifically, for behaviours utilized 
to cope with anxiety, it has been suggested that the exact behaviour may not be as important as 
the function it serves for the individual or why they decided to utilize such behaviour (e.g., 
Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  Theoretically there is a 





improvement, and those which may interfere with long-term gains and thus are encouraged to be 
dropped over the course of treatment.  As mentioned previously, strategies that may hinder long-
term improvement are those that are aimed at preventing feared catastrophes, but may also 
include overuse and reliance upon seemingly adaptive coping strategies (Thwaites & Freeston, 
2005).  Furthermore, considering the potential importance of context, the same behaviour 
employed in two different situations may serve a different purpose on each occasion, and may be 
adaptive in one case and maladaptive in another.  In summary, distraction is often used as a 
coping strategy that may be viewed as adaptive, but its overuse, use in certain situations, or 
reliance upon distraction may indeed lead to its characterization as a maladaptive avoidance 
strategy. 
Another theory that supports the notion that distraction may not in fact be harmful to 
exposure outcome relates to Bandura’s self-efficacy theory.  Specifically, Bandura (1977, 1988) 
proposed that fear reduction and symptom improvement can occur via increased self-efficacy 
(i.e., a sense of mastery over a situation or sense of accomplishment associated with task 
completion).  Theoretically, when an individual conquers a task they initially perceived as 
difficult (e.g., completing a challenging exposure), the associated sense of accomplishment and 
achievement will bolster symptom reduction.  Gaining a sense of mastery over conquering fears 
may also encourage enhanced willingness to complete later exposure exercises.  Therefore, the 
mere completion of potentially difficult tasks may lead to increased self-efficacy, which 
theoretically could occur across a range of exposure conditions.  Indeed, increases in self-
efficacy predict psychological change (e.g. Jones & Menzies, 2000; Zoellner, Echiverri, & 
Craske, 2000), further supporting the importance of self-efficacy to treatment outcome.  
Importantly, individuals tend to assess how well they coped in a given situation based on their 
level of physiological arousal; therefore, arousal-reducing techniques such as distraction may 
play a role in further enhancing self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1988).  It is therefore proposed that 
distraction techniques may not interfere with exposure and may in fact aid in reducing 
physiological response, thereby allowing for greater increases in self-efficacy.   
Reducing physiological response in the context of exposure has been highlighted in other 
areas of psychological treatment research.  Specifically, early treatments for anxiety disorders 
were conducted using systematic desensitization, which involved imaginal exposure to feared 





inhibition (e.g., Wolpe, 1958).  It was proposed that the use of relaxation strategies in 
conjunction with exposure to feared stimuli would create a response that is incompatible with an 
individual’s expectations in their feared situation (i.e., being relaxed while imaging one’s 
greatest fear).  In this case, the individual learns both that they can cope in once-anxiety-
provoking situations, and that the ability to be relaxed in the situation is indicative of a lack of 
objective danger.  It is therefore unsurprising that relaxation or calming techniques have often 
been proposed as methods that can increase emotional processing and exposure outcome (e.g., 
Rachman, 1980).  Furthermore, given that emotional processing theory states that exposure will 
not be effective if physiological arousal is excessively high, relaxation has been proposed to be 
helpful in exposure via increasing attention and decreasing arousal (Foa & Kozak, 1986).  
Overall, the use of strategies that induce relaxation are purported to be useful in the context of 
exposure in anxiety.  Although these same theories suggest against the use of distraction due to 
insufficient attentional resources or incomplete emotional processing, it is possible that the 
potential relaxation-inducing role of distraction was not fully considered in these initial 
conceptualizations.  It is also possible that relaxation may be helpful only when certain levels of 
distress or anxiety are present, but not at other levels of distress.  For example, perhaps 
relaxation strategies are optimal when distress is high in order to help individuals be able to 
engage in exposure, whereas if distress is already low, relaxation may lead to their anxiety 
decreasing to a level where conducting exposure is no longer warranted due to the lack of a fear 
reaction.  Therefore, the aforementioned theories may shed some light on when relaxation or 
distraction may be useful, but more remains to be understood about the impact of using 
distraction when experiencing different levels of distress. 
Others have suggested that certain strategies used to control anxiety may not be as 
detrimental as once thought.  For example, in a review of the literature related to anxiety control 
strategies, Parrish, Radomsky, and Dugas (2008) suggested that the use of such strategies is 
unlikely to be counterproductive if the strategy utilizes minimal attentional resources, enhances 
self-efficacy (for example through relaxation or increased cognitive change), enables belief 
disconfirmation through disconfirmatory experiences, and does not lead to misattributing safety 
in the situation to the strategy utilized.  In this review, a number of hypotheses were presented 
regarding the use of distraction during exposure, some of which parallel the theories mentioned 





relaxation might be useful whereas distraction strategies that increase arousal (e.g., through 
excitement or frustration) may be detrimental, and that moderate levels of distraction may not 
induce a sense of relaxation or increased anxiety, and thus may not impact outcome.   
Another hypothesis proposed by Parrish, Radomsky, and Dugas (2008) relates to the 
cognitive load of distraction tasks, and is based on the notion that more distracting tasks are 
likely to reduce the amount of cognitive resources remaining to attend to and process the 
exposure (e.g., Telch et al., 2004).  It is suggested that a certain optimal level of attentional 
resources may need to be focused on the feared stimulus or situation in order for fear reduction 
to occur.  Specifically, high levels of attention to a feared stimulus or situation may lead to 
increased threat perceptions and anxiety reactions, while if minimal attention is available to be 
directed toward a feared stimulus this may inhibit fear reduction due to a lack of cognitive 
resources remaining to emotionally process the exposure (see Johnstone & Page, 2004; McNally, 
2007; Telch et al., 2004).  Overall, while distraction and other anxiety control strategies may 
have the potential to negatively impact treatment, it is likely that under certain conditions these 
techniques may actually be helpful, and indeed aid in fear reduction (Parrish, Radomsky, & 
Dugas, 2008).  It is further proposed that the use of safety-seeking strategies will only be harmful 
if they preclude fear disconfirmation, and that the use of such strategies in the early stages of 
treatment may in fact facilitate fear reduction while also reducing high levels of treatment refusal 
and drop out (Rachman, Radomsky, & Shafran, 2008). 
Overall, although distraction has historically been viewed as a potential obstacle to 
progress in exposure-based treatments due to reduced attentional focus and subsequent 
interruptions in emotional processing, there are also a number of theories that support the notion 
that distraction may not necessarily be detrimental to exposure outcome.  These theories suggest 
a number of different possibilities to explain why distraction may not be as disadvantageous as 
was once suggested, including the possibility that fear disconfirmation remains possible when 
distraction is utilized, that self-efficacy (which has been implicated in favourable exposure 
outcome) may increase as a result of the use of distraction, and that distraction may function in a 
manner more similar to adaptive coping than to maladaptive avoidance of feared stimuli or 
situations.   
Consistent with contrasting theories regarding the potential impact of distraction on 





distraction use.  Specifically, while some studies show detrimental effects associated with the use 
of distraction during exposure (e.g., Craske, Street, & Barlow, 1989; Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 
1982; Haw & Dickerson, 1998; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995), others 
show that distraction aids in exposure (e.g., Craske, Street, Jayaraman, & Barlow, 1991; Garcia-
Palacios et al., 2007; Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1986; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 
2003, 2008; Penfold & Page, 1999), and others show no differences in exposure outcome when 
distraction is or is not utilized (e.g., Antony et al., 2001; Rose & McGlynn, 1997; Wood & 
McGlynn, 2000).  To illustrate the types of studies and varied results in the distraction literature, 
selected examples are presented below. 
In a study conducted by Antony and colleagues (2001), individuals diagnosed with spider 
phobia (N = 60) underwent two hours of exposure.  In the first hour, participants were randomly 
assigned to either focus their attention on the feared stimulus (focused condition) or to listen to 
an audio recording about world geography (distraction condition).  In the second hour, all 
individuals completed uninstructed exposure (in order for all participants to additionally receive 
treatment as usual).  Behavioural approach tests were completed prior to exposure, and following 
completion of both the first and second hour of exposure.  Results indicated no significant 
difference between distracted versus focused exposure, both following the first hour of exposure 
(when the experimental manipulation occurred) and following the full two hours of exposure.  
Therefore, the use of distraction did not interfere with fear reduction during exposure.  While the 
authors raised the concern that the selected distraction task may not have been sufficiently 
distracting, they were able to show that individuals in the distraction condition were paying 
attention to the audio recording. 
In another study, Oliver and Page (2003) recruited a subclinical sample of individuals 
with blood-injection-injury fears (N = 48) who were randomly assigned to complete exposure 
with distraction, with attentional focus, or exposure alone.  In this case, the distraction task 
consisted of a conversation about neutral topics, and the focused attention task involved the 
participant providing verbal descriptions of the exposure stimuli (a syringe containing stage 
blood and two gruesome photographs, displayed on and surrounding a computer screen).  Three 
separate 10-minute exposure sessions were conducted over consecutive weekly visits.  In order 
to maintain visual attention on the feared stimuli, participants also responded to cues on the 





condition was associated with the greatest fear reduction both within and between sessions (and 
at one month follow-up) when compared to focused attention and exposure alone. 
Another study aimed to investigate the impact of distraction on exposure specifically 
through the use of a high level of distraction.  Telch and colleagues (2004) recruited participants 
with high levels of claustrophobic fear (N = 60) who were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions: attention to threatening words, attention to neutral words, distraction, or exposure 
alone.  The distraction task was a modified Seashore Rhythm Test which consisted of identifying 
whether pairs of auditory tones were the same or different; this task is known for requiring a 
large amount of information processing resources.  The exposure took place in a claustrophobia 
chamber and consisted of multiple short exposures (five minutes maximum) separated by three 
minute breaks.  Participants completed as many short exposure exercises as were necessary to 
allow 30 minutes of exposure.  Results indicated that at post-exposure the distraction condition 
fared worse than all other conditions (exposure alone and both attention conditions), and this 
effect was greater for between-exercise habituation than fear level during exposure.  Given that 
the task utilized in this study was cognitively demanding, the authors concluded that the amount 
of cognitive resources necessary to complete a distraction task may be an important 
consideration.  Specifically, it was proposed that the distraction task interfered with threat 
disconfirmation through reducing the ability to process exposure-relevant information. 
Although the aforementioned examples only provide a brief overview of the distraction 
studies that have been conducted, they are illustrative of the differences seen across studies.  
Indeed, an early review of studies investigating the impact of distraction on exposure outcome 
identified inconsistent results (Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  It was suggested that the use of 
differing forms of distraction and vast differences in experimental paradigms may be in part 
responsible for conflicting results.  For example, they observed inconsistencies in the amount of 
attentional resources required to complete distraction tasks, the type of attention utilized (e.g., 
cognitive, visual, or tactile), and the level of affect related to the distraction task.  It was 
therefore proposed that more consistent paradigms need to be explored to better ascertain the role 
of distraction in exposure.  Although the conclusions of this review remain informative, 
numerous additional investigations of distraction use have been conducted since its completion.  
However, a recent meta-analysis described similarly inconsistent findings across studies (Podină 





studies: analyses were restricted to investigations that were conducted with individuals with 
specific phobia (or analogue specific phobia samples) that also employed a between-subjects 
design.  Analyses showed no differences between focused or distracted exposure when 
considering distress level or physiological reactions, but for behavioural outcome measures 
exposure with distraction was more effective than focused exposure, particularly at follow-up 
assessments.   
A number of factors related to distraction use may impact outcome, which may explain 
the vast differences in results across studies (e.g., Podină et al., 2013; Rodriguez & Craske, 
1993).  These factors include (but are not limited to) individual differences (e.g., coping style, 
personality), experimental design (e.g., type of distraction [level of distraction intensity, affective 
valence, type of attention required], length of exposure, outcome measures, instructions), and the 
nature of the problem being investigated (e.g., type of anxiety disorder or analogue sample being 
used).  For example, moderation analyses conducted during a meta-analysis of distraction studies 
indicated that improvement in both behavioural approach and reported distress were more robust 
when distraction tasks were interactive, and if the exposure took place over multiple sessions 
(Podină et al., 2013).  The results of this meta-analysis provide important insight regarding 
factors that may relate to when distraction may be useful in exposure, but many additional 
factors remain unexplored.  It is important to continue evaluating when, how, and for whom 
distraction may be a useful technique in the context of exposure therapy.  However, it is not 
feasible to concurrently address many factors in a single experimental study; therefore, the 
purpose of the current research program was to better understand the impact and importance of a 
small subset of these factors on exposure outcome and treatment acceptability.   
One area that has yet to be addressed (to this author’s knowledge) relates to the beliefs an 
individual holds about distraction use, and more specifically the level of importance placed on 
being able to utilize distraction when anxious.  Indeed, Rodriguez and Craske (1993) 
hypothesized that coping style (i.e., preferred or typical methods of dealing with anxiety) may 
have more of an impact on exposure outcome than whether or not distraction is used during 
exposure.  Furthermore, although they were referring to a broad range of safety-seeking 
behaviours, Thwaites and Freeston (2005) proposed numerous factors that may determine 
whether behaviours are maladaptive or could be considered adaptive coping, including the 





purpose is to protect the individual, or if they are reliant on the strategy.  They also suggested 
that frequency of use may play an important role, and that consistent use (i.e., reliance) may be 
indicative of a maladaptive coping strategy.  This highlights the importance of understanding the 
idiosyncratic beliefs an individual holds about the role distraction plays in coping with anxiety-
provoking situations.   
In addition to factors specifically related to distraction, the importance of targeting beliefs 
more generally is often viewed as essential to treatment.  Thoughts and beliefs play a central role 
in the cognitive model of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, 1976), and remain an important target in 
the cognitive-behavioural treatment of a range of anxiety and related disorders (e.g., Clark & 
Beck, 2010; Shafran, Brosan, & Cooper, 2013).  In fact, research groups have been formed 
specifically with the goal of understanding the importance of cognitions, for example in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; e.g., the Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group; OCCWG, 1997).  Furthermore, many researchers have focused on further evaluating 
specific belief domains within disorders, and incorporating these beliefs in treatment (e.g., 
maladaptive beliefs about memory in OCD; Alcolado & Radomsky, 2015).  Being able to 
accurately identify and target beliefs in the context of treatment, especially those that may be 
interfering with treatment progression, is likely important to both symptom improvement and 
sustained treatment gains.  Furthermore, behavioural experiments, an intervention technique that 
involves testing specific beliefs with targeted experiments, have become a well-used and 
effective component of cognitive-behavioural therapy (e.g., Bennett-Levy et al., 2004; McMillan 
& Lee, 2010), providing further support for the importance of targeted belief change during 
treatment.  A focus on measuring beliefs about distraction may thus be an important area of 
study that may allow these beliefs to be targeted more specifically in the context of behavioural 
experiments in treatment.  
Another important factor is one which has been noted in the distraction literature but not 
directly assessed, namely the amount of cognitive load or attention required to complete a 
distraction task.  The amount of attentional resources required to complete a distraction task has 
received theoretical attention (e.g., Johnstone & Page, 2004; Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; 
Rodriguez & Craske, 1993) and has emerged as a factor to consider in experimental studies (e.g., 
Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Telch et al., 2004).  Although Telch and 





effects of distraction tasks with high cognitive demand, they utilized distraction tasks with high 
levels of demand but did not compare multiple levels of distraction.  To this author’s knowledge, 
varied levels of attentional resources have not been successfully compared in a single study.   
One study attempted to manipulate levels of distraction by comparing the impact of 
viewing highly affective images (categorized as “high distraction”), neutral images (categorized 
as “low distraction”), or completing no distraction task (Rodriguez & Craske, 1995).  The 
hypothesis was that images containing emotional content would be more distracting and utilize 
more attentional resources than viewing neutral images.  While on the surface it may appear that 
distraction level could be effectively manipulated through the use of different images, 
participants in both distraction conditions were provided with explicit instructions to “focus on 
the slides as much as possible” and to “try to remember as many details as you can about each 
slide, as you will be tested on them later” (Rodriguez & Craske, 1995, pp. 341).  Unsurprisingly, 
differences in attentiveness to the images were not observed between the high and low 
distraction conditions, likely due to reduced impact of the affective level of the images when 
equally high importance was placed on attention to the images in both conditions.  Therefore, the 
authors combined these two conditions into a single distraction condition and were subsequently 
unable to evaluate potential differences in outcome related to distraction intensity.  Although 
some issues arose regarding the manipulation of distraction levels in this study, the importance 
of investigating level of distraction in exposure was underlined.  Specifically, the amount of 
attention allocated to the exposure experience will depend in part on the amount of cognitive 
resources being utilized by other tasks.  Completing concurrent tasks that draw attention away 
from the exposure experience may impede improvement, which may be due to insufficient 
emotional processing (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986), or an inability to attend to information 
necessary for threat disconfirmation (e.g., Craske et al., 2014; Telch et al., 2004).  Importantly, it 
is possible that low and moderate levels of distraction may not interfere with exposure outcome, 
whereas high levels of distraction may have a negative impact (for more detail, see Chapter 4). 
In addition to understanding the role of differing levels of distraction on exposure 
outcome, it is important to investigate the impact distraction use might have on perceived 
acceptability of treatment.  Given that treatment refusal and drop-out rates are high (e.g., 44% 
drop-out rate, Bados, Balaguer, & Saldaña, 2007; combined treatment refusal and drop-out rate 





individuals to begin or complete treatment.  Although there are many possible ways to attempt to 
increase treatment acceptability, the use of safety behaviour (which often includes distraction) in 
the initial phases of treatment may allow individuals to feel somewhat less anxious and therefore 
more willing to engage in exposure (e.g., Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; Rachman, 
Radomsky, & Shafran, 2008).  While treatment acceptability has been investigated in relation to 
overt forms of safety behaviour (e.g., safety gear; Levy & Radomsky, 2014), it has yet to be 
investigated in the context of covert safety behaviour (e.g., distraction). 
The research program described below aimed to investigate and clarify the role of 
potential factors that may be responsible for discrepant findings in the extant literature on 
distraction use in exposure, and to investigate the impact of distraction on treatment 
acceptability.  The presented studies include the development of a measure to assess maladaptive 
beliefs about distraction, and an experimental investigation of the impact of different validated 
levels of distraction on exposure outcome and other treatment-relevant variables (e.g., self-
efficacy, treatment acceptability; see Chapter 4).  The availability of a measure to assess 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction has important clinical implications, and will aid in more 
accurate assessment of the impact of these beliefs on exposure outcome, both with and without 
distraction use (see Chapter 5).  Additionally, experimental evaluation of the cognitive load 
associated with different distraction tasks followed by an examination of the impact of these 
distraction tasks during an exposure session will provide important insight into the impact of 
variable amounts of distraction on exposure outcome.  This will aid in clarifying the role of 
cognitive load, which has the potential to further our understanding of the discrepant findings in 
the distraction literature.  Given that there is disagreement regarding whether distraction may be 
beneficial or detrimental during exposure, an investigation of relevant factors that differ across 
existing investigations will be informative and begin to clarify our theoretical understanding and 












Measuring Beliefs about Distraction: Might the Function of Distraction  
Matter More than Distraction Itself? 
Distraction, or mentally distancing oneself from an expected focus of attention, is a 
strategy that many people use in anxiety-provoking situations (or more generally, to cope with a 
range of negative emotions).  Historically, distraction use has been proposed to have a negative 
impact on exposure outcome during cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT).  For example, Foa and 
Kozak’s (1986) emotional processing theory of fear reduction suggests that a fear structure must 
be activated in order for exposure to be effective, and that distraction will block this fear 
structure from being fully activated due to a lack of focused attention on the feared stimulus.  
From a cognitive perspective, distraction could be construed as a possible barrier or hindrance to 
the acquisition of disconfirmatory information (Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008).  Overall, it 
is suggested that the use of distraction when anxious interferes with exposure outcome by 
restricting learning.   
Although the aforementioned theories have led many clinicians to advise against or to 
encourage clients to eliminate the use of distraction during exposure, there are theories that 
suggest that distraction may not have a negative impact on treatment, and may actually enhance 
fear reduction.  For example, Bandura (1977, 1988) proposed that fear reduction can occur via 
increased self-efficacy due to a sense of mastery over a situation, leading to increased 
confidence.  Therefore, the mere completion of an exposure exercise allows for fear reduction 
regardless of the exposure conditions.  This self-efficacy theory further posits that there may be 
benefits to the use of distraction.  Specifically, emotional arousal can contribute to perceptions of 
coping ability, and distraction often reduces arousal levels, thereby providing individuals with 
the sense that they are capable of conquering difficult tasks.  Others have also suggested that the 
use of distraction may not be detrimental, specifically if the goal does not relate to preventing 
feared catastrophes but is rather aimed at reducing distress (e.g., Salkovskis, 1991; Salkovskis, 
Clark, & Gelder, 1996). 
Over the past few decades, numerous studies have experimentally evaluated the use of 
distraction in the context of exposure.  A review conducted by Rodriguez and Craske (1993) 
explored the results of early investigations of distraction use in exposure.  Findings differed 





inconsistent experimental paradigms.  Since 1993, numerous additional studies have been 
conducted with (continued) mixed findings.  Many studies have shown that distraction is helpful 
during exposure (e.g., Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 2008), that distraction is harmful 
to the exposure process (e.g., Schmid-Leuz, Elsesser, Lohrmann, Jöhren, & Sartory, 2007; 
Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Telch et al., 2004), and that there are no differences between using 
and not using distraction (e.g., Antony et al., 2001; Rose & McGlynn, 1997).  Given these mixed 
findings, it is important to consider what other factors may be involved, potentially leading to 
discrepant findings.  These include (but are not limited to) individual differences, experimental 
design (e.g., type of distraction used, length of exposure, outcome measures, instructions), and 
the nature of the problem being investigated (e.g., type of anxiety disorder or analogue sample 
being used).   
Surprisingly, very little research has been conducted to investigate individual differences 
(e.g., personality, psychopathology, coping style, individual preferences for distraction use, 
perceived necessity of distraction use) that may relate to outcome in exposure with or without 
distraction.  Given that these factors vary across individuals, it is possible that some or all of 
these elements may relate to inconsistent findings across studies.  It may be especially important 
to consider how much individuals naturally tend to distract themselves in the context of anxiety-
provoking situations, as well as their perceptions of the utility of distraction.  Specifically, 
individuals who tend to rely more on distraction in their daily lives may benefit less from using 
distraction during treatment, whereas individuals who do not tend to use distraction may actually 
benefit from using distraction during exposure, at least during initial phases of treatment.  
Indeed, Rodriguez and Craske (1993) suggested that natural coping style may predict treatment 
outcome better than the use of attention focus versus distraction during exposure.  Others have 
further suggested the potential importance of the intention or purpose behind the use of coping 
strategies (e.g., Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Thwaites & Freeston, 2005), noting that 
understanding the reason driving the use of such strategies may aid in categorizing maladaptive 
versus adaptive coping.  While adaptive coping may not lead to long-term consequences, the use 
of maladaptive coping strategies (or the overuse or reliance upon these strategies) aimed at 
preventing feared outcomes may be problematic (Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  Furthermore, the 
theory that distraction use may not interfere with treatment because it does not specifically aim 





distraction, as the function of distraction use may then be construed as aiming to prevent a 
catastrophic outcome.  Unfortunately, research related to the typical use of and/or maladaptive 
beliefs about distraction (i.e., reliance on distraction) has thus far been limited. 
Most research conducted on individual differences in typical distraction use has assessed 
general coping strategies such as the use of monitoring (i.e., seeking out information related to 
threat) or blunting (i.e., blocking out threat information) coping styles (Miller, 1980).  Given that 
Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that attention to feared stimuli is important to effective 
exposure, it was theorized that monitors, (who inherently attend to threat) would benefit from 
exposure more than blunters (who avoid threat).  A number of studies investigated whether 
monitors or blunters differ in terms of exposure response.  Generally, results indicated little or no 
difference between individuals who monitor versus those who blunt in terms of treatment 
outcome (Muris, de Jong, Merckelbach, & van Zuuren, 1993a; Steketee, Bransfield, Miller, & 
Foa, 1989), and in one case blunters actually showed greater improvement (Muris, de Jong, 
Merckelbach, & van Zuuren, 1993b).  In an effort to extend these findings, Antony and 
colleagues (2001) investigated individual differences in participants’ typical use of monitoring 
and blunting strategies and how conducting exposure with or without distraction impacted 
outcome in each of these groups.  They predicted that for individuals who tend to use a blunting 
coping style, distraction use would interfere with the ability to benefit from exposure, whereas 
those who tend to monitor may benefit from the use of distraction.  They examined these 
hypotheses in a sample of spider phobic individuals, and found no interaction between coping 
style and symptom improvement: exposure outcome was similar whether or not distraction was 
used, and also regardless of typical coping style.   
Although the study conducted by Antony and colleagues (2001) provided initial insight 
into how individual coping styles may (or may not) relate to outcome of focused versus 
distracted exposure, it was limited somewhat by the measurement of the two coping styles 
(monitoring and blunting) that were investigated.  Firstly, monitoring and blunting are not 
mutually exclusive categories, and thus individuals may not fit cleanly into one category or 
another, making it more difficult to evaluate differences between coping styles.  Furthermore, 
typical scales used to assess the general use of monitoring and blunting coping styles either 
include a small range of uncontrollable or threatening situations (e.g., Miller Behavioral Style 





such as a medical procedure (e.g., Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire (MBQ); Muris, van 
Zuuren, de Jong, de Beurs, & Hanewald, 1994), and therefore do not reflect a broad range of 
situations.  Finally, the blunting component of these measures assesses how much an individual 
engages in distraction-related techniques, but does not assess specific beliefs related to 
distraction use. 
A number of existing questionnaires include small subscales assessing the use of 
distraction when anxious; however, many of these questionnaires are limited to only a few items, 
and therefore may not be comprehensive.  For example, the Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire 
(CAQ; Sexton & Dugas, 2008) was developed in the context of research on generalized anxiety 
disorder and evaluates a variety of strategies individuals may utilize in response to their 
thoughts.  The CAQ includes a distraction subscale with five items such as “I often do things to 
distract myself from my thoughts” and “To avoid thinking about subjects that upset me, I force 
myself to think about something else”.  Another questionnaire, the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), 
includes a number of strategies an individual may use to cope in difficult situations.  This 
measure was initially developed with a population of hurricane survivors, and has since been 
used in a number of research areas including health psychology.  The Brief COPE’s self-
distraction subscale consists of only two items, including “I've been turning to work or other 
activities to take my mind off things”.   
Importantly, the questions used to assess distraction use in existing measures typically 
address whether or not individuals distract themselves and occasionally what strategies they use.  
Although it is important to ascertain whether and how people use distraction when anxious, it 
may be essential to understand what importance individuals place on the use of distraction.  For 
example, if one individual who uses distraction finds it helpful yet does not feel overly reliant on 
distraction use, this person may react differently to the use (or lack thereof) of distraction in the 
context of treatment than someone who feels that distraction is necessary to be able to make it 
through anxiety-provoking situations (i.e., maladaptive beliefs about distraction).  Given the 
potential importance of knowing whether or not distraction can or should be used with 
individuals who tend to distract themselves to cope with anxiety, it is imperative that we have the 
ability to measure this reliably.  It is therefore important to assess the beliefs an individual holds 





This study aimed to take a preliminary step towards understanding the impact of beliefs 
about distraction on exposure outcome through creating and validating a questionnaire to assess 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction: the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI).  The 
measure evaluates facets such as how necessary, essential, and effective an individual feels 
distraction is when faced with anxiety, and how frequently they use distraction when in anxiety-
provoking situations.  A questionnaire of this nature will allow for more accurate assessment of 
distraction-related beliefs, which can then be used to better assess the relationships between 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction and the efficacy of using distraction during exposure.   
The BADI was first validated through an exploratory factor analysis with an unselected 
student sample (to allow for a range of responses), and then further assessed with a confirmatory 
factor analysis with a contamination-fearful sample (to confirm the factor structure in a sample 
that would likely display a smaller range of scores).  We hypothesized that scores on the BADI 
would correlate with measures assessing frequency and/or type of distraction use (e.g., the MBQ 
blunting subscale, the CAQ), and would not correlate with seemingly unrelated constructs (e.g., 
agreeableness, the MBQ monitoring subscale).  We further hypothesized that BADI scores 
would be related to self-reported symptoms of psychopathology.  Finally, we hypothesized that 




Participants were recruited independently for two different samples: an unselected 
student sample for an exploratory factor analysis, and a contamination-fearful sample for a 
confirmatory factor analysis.  Due to the fact that participants from the two samples were 
recruited for two different studies, the measures administered to each sample were not identical 
(see below).  
Unselected student sample.  Participants were undergraduate students (N = 506) who 
completed a battery of self-report questionnaires through an online survey system in exchange 
for extra credit in a course.  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 57 (M = 22.84, SD = 5.26) 
years, and the majority of participants was female (n = 436, 86%) and identified themselves as 
Caucasian (n = 339, 67%).  In order to assess the nonclinical nature of the sample, participants 





Scales-21 (see Table 1) were somewhat higher than student sample means from a previous study 
(Henry & Crawford, 2005), but well below the means for individuals with clinically diagnosed 
anxiety and mood disorders (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).  Mean scores on 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory also reflected scores for nonclinical samples in other studies (e.g., 
Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995).  Together these findings support the nonclinical nature of the 
current sample. 
Contamination-fearful sample.  Undergraduate students and community members were 
pre-screened for high levels of contamination fear and were invited to take part in a larger study 
investigating a component of treatment for contamination fear.  Of the participants who 
completed the larger study, only individuals with a contamination subscale score of 14 or higher 
on the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004), were 
included in the current sample.  This inclusion score was selected because it falls both one 
standard deviation below the mean of individuals with contamination-related OCD, and one 
standard deviation above the student sample mean (Thordarson et al., 2004). 
A total of 132 individuals met criteria and were included in the current study.  This 
sample consisted of 103 undergraduate students who completed the study in exchange for course 
credit, and 29 community members who were recruited through online advertisements and 
completed the study in exchange for financial compensation.  The majority of participants was 
female (n = 115, 87%) and identified themselves as Caucasian (n = 69, 52%).  Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 81 years, with a mean age of 25.78 (SD = 9.91) years.  Mean scores on 
the contamination subscale of the VOCI reflect those reported by a clinical sample with 
contamination-related obsessive-compulsive disorder (Thordarson et al., 2004), and are reported 
in Table 1 along with mean scores on measures of general symptoms of anxiety and depression.   
Measures 
Measures completed by both the unselected student and contamination-fearful 
samples 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI).  The BADI is a measure of maladaptive 
beliefs about distraction, developed to be validated in the current study.  The goal was to include 
items related to beliefs about the necessity, effectiveness, and frequency of distraction use, due to 
suggestions that the intention behind the use of coping strategies (including overuse or reliance 






Self-Reported Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression in the Unselected Student and 
Contamination-Fearful Samples 
 Unselected Student 
(n = 506) 
Contamination-Fearful 
(n = 132) 
 M SD M SD 
DASS-21     
     Depression 4.48 4.10 - - 
     Anxiety 3.43 3.25 - - 
     Stress 6.68 4.20 - - 
BAI 11.20 8.59 14.74 10.48 
BDI-II - - 14.14 11.31 
VOCI-CTN - - 26.64 9.21 
Note. DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II 
= Beck Depression Inventory-II; VOCI-CTN = Contamination Subscale of the Vancouver 



















Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  We also decided to include items representing a belief that 
distraction works, as we did not necessarily expect that individuals would report relying on 
distraction if they find it useful.  Items were created in consultation with a team of researchers by 
first describing the desired content areas and then requesting feedback on both wording and item 
selection.  Items were rejected if they were confusing or did not appear relevant to the constructs 
being evaluated.   
The initial BADI included 43 potential items and was reduced through factor analysis 
(and removal of reverse-scored items) to 24 items related to beliefs about the necessity and 
utility of distraction when faced with anxiety-provoking situations (see Table 2 for retained 
items).  Individuals responded using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree very much and 7 = 
agree very much).  Total scores can range from 24 to 168.  Prior to responding to individual 
items, individuals are asked to consider the types of distraction they typically use and indicate 
their typical strategies on a provided list of 12 distraction techniques (e.g., think of something 
relaxing or calming, read something, talk to someone, think about something important to me)
1
. 
Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire (MBQ; Muris et al., 1994).  The MBQ presents 
individuals with ten hypothetical threat-related situations, as well as definitions of both 
monitoring (i.e., information-seeking) and blunting (i.e., information-avoiding).  For each 
hypothetical threat-related situation, individuals use a 10-point scale Likert scale (0 = not at all 
and 10 = very much) to rate both the extent to which they would use a monitoring coping style, 
and to what extent they would use a blunting coping style.  Each subscale can have scores 
ranging from 0 to 100.  In this study, the blunting subscale of the MBQ was used in order to 
determine the convergent validity of the BADI, given that this subscale is relevant to the use of 
distraction.  The monitoring subscale was used to assess for divergent validity.  Internal 
consistency in the unselected student sample was α = .77 for the monitoring subscale, and α = 
.76 for the blunting subscale.  Internal consistency in the contamination-fearful sample was α = 
.74 for the monitoring subscale, and α = .81 for the blunting subscale. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990).  The BAI is a 21-item questionnaire 
that assesses general symptoms of anxiety.  Participants indicate the how much they have been 
bothered by a variety of anxiety-related symptoms (e.g., dizziness, difficulty breathing, sweating)  
                                                          
1
 The final version of the BADI (including the instructions and distraction techniques checklist) is available free of 






Two-Factor Solution for the BADI Using Principal Axis Factoring 
  Factor Loadings  
Item BADI-N BADI-E h
2 
19. If I can’t distract myself, I won’t be able to handle my 
anxiety 
.92 -.16 .71 
17. If I don’t distract myself, there is no way I can make it 
through difficult situations 
.89 -.15 .67 
7. If I don’t properly distract myself when I’m anxious, I 
may “lose it” completely 
.84 -.11 .61 
18. My anxiety overwhelms me if I don’t distract myself .81 -.04 .62 
13. Feeling anxious is unbearable, so I always try to distract 
myself 
.80 .01 .65 
5. Without distraction, I wouldn’t be able to cope with 
anxiety 
.78 -.03 .58 
11. I have to distract myself the entire time that I am in an 
anxiety-provoking situation for it to work 
.76 -.02 .55 
8. Distraction is the only way I can get rid of anxiety .74 .03 .57 
23. I distract myself every time that I am in an anxiety-
provoking situation 
.72 .12 .64 
16. I constantly use distraction to feel less anxious .71 .12 .61 
6. I don’t know of any better way to reduce my anxiety than 
using distraction 
.65 -.03 .41 
15. I use a lot of mental effort to focus on distracting myself 
when I’m anxious 
.58 .11 .42 
2. Distracting myself is the only way to make it through an 
anxious situation 
.58 .14 .44 
9. I use distraction even in situations that only make me a 
little bit anxious 
.54 .10 .36 
4. I always distract myself when I’m feeling anxious .53 .28 .53 
21. When I know I’m going to be in an anxiety-provoking 
situation, I always prepare to distract myself 
.51 .16 .37 
12. I wish I could make it through difficult situations without 
needing to distract myself 
.48 .10 .29 
24. When I am anxious, I am able to feel less anxious by 
distracting myself 
-.10 .81 .58 
22. Distraction helps me manage my anxiety .09 .76 .66 
3. Distraction is useful for reducing my anxiety -.08 .74 .49 
10. Using distraction makes anxiety manageable .04 .71 .53 
20. I distract myself because I am less anxious if part of my 
mind is focused on something else 
.07 .56 .37 
14. Distracting myself makes it easier for me to stay in 
anxiety-provoking situations 
.15 .51 .37 





 Eigenvalue 10.88 2.39  
 % of variance 45.32 9.95  
Note. N = 475; h
2

































in the past week using a 4-point Likert-type scale with scores ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 
(severely – I could barely stand it).  Scores on the BAI can range from 0 to 63.  The BAI was 
used to determine whether the unselected student sample was nonclinical in nature, and whether 
the BADI was associated with general symptoms of anxiety.  In the unselected student sample 
internal consistency was α = .90, and in the contamination-fearful sample it was α = .92. 
Measures completed by the unselected student sample only 
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; Sexton & Dugas, 2008).  This English 
version of the CAQ was adapted from the original version (Gosselin et al., 2002).  The CAQ is a 
25-item questionnaire assessing five domains of cognitive avoidance techniques, including 
thought suppression, avoidance of threat, thought substitution, transformation of images into 
thoughts, and distraction.  Participants use a 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (completely typical) Likert-
type scale to indicate whether they typically use the strategy that is presented.  Total scores can 
range from 25 to 125.  Retest reliability was high for the total scale (r = .85) and subscales 
(ranging from r =.70-.79; Sexton & Dugas, 2008).  The distraction subscale (which consists of 
five items) was used in the current study to assess for construct validity of the BADI.  The 
internal consistency for the distraction subscale in the unselected student sample was α = .85. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).  This 
scale is composed of 21 items that assess three subscales: depression, anxiety, and stress.  
Participants use a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (almost always) to 
indicate how often each statement applied to them over the past week.  Each subscale contains 
seven items; therefore, scores in each subscale can range from 0 to 21.  The DASS was used in 
the current study to verify the nonclinical nature of the unselected student sample, and to assess 
the relationship between anxiety, stress, and depressive symptoms and distraction-related beliefs.  
Internal consistencies for the unselected student sample were α = .89 for the depression subscale, 
α = .76 for the anxiety subscale, and α = .85 for the stress subscale. 
Brief COPE (Carver, 1997).  The Brief COPE is a 28-item scale that assesses different 
ways in which people cope with stressful situations.  Participants are asked to respond to items 
on a 1 (I haven’t been doing this at all) to 4 (I’ve been doing this a lot) scale.  The Brief COPE 
includes 14 two-item subscales, including denial, active coping, venting, acceptance, positive 
reframing, and self-distraction.  Each two-item subscale has a score range of 1 to 8.  The self-





distraction subscale, consisting of two items, had an internal consistency of α = .71 in a 
population of individuals tested following a hurricane (Carver, 1997).  In the unselected student 
sample, internal consistency of the two-item self-distraction subscale was α = .42. 
Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  The RSQ is a 71-item 
questionnaire that assesses behaviours individuals engage in when feeling depressed.  Individuals 
use a 4-point Likert-type scale with scores ranging from 0 (almost never) to 3 (almost always) to 
indicate how frequently they engage in each of the coping strategies.  The RSQ contains four 
subscales: rumination, distraction, problem-solving, and dangerous activities.  In the current 
study, the distraction subscale of the RSQ was used to assess the convergent validity of the 
BADI.  The distraction subscale contains 11 items, so subscale scores can range from 0 to 33.  
Internal consistency for the distraction subscale in the unselected student sample was α = .75. 
Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991).  The BFI is a 44-item 
questionnaire that assesses each of the big five personality traits: openness, agreeableness, 
neuroticism, conscientiousness, and extraversion.  Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).  The agreeableness subscale (nine items 
with a range of possible scores from 9 to 45) of this measure was used to assess divergent 
validity with the BADI.  The internal consistency of this subscale in the unselected student 
sample was α = .75. 
Measures completed by the contamination-fearful sample only 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004) is a 55-
item questionnaire that assesses a broad range of obsessive compulsive symptoms, including a 
contamination subscale consisting of contamination-related obsessions and associated washing 
and cleaning compulsions.  The contamination subscale (VOCI-CTN) was used in the current 
study to assess severity of contamination fear.  The VOCI-CTN subscale is composed of 12 
items, leading to a score range of 0 to 48.  Participants use a 5-point Likert-type scale with scores 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much) to indicate how much each statement is true of them.  
Retest reliability in a student sample was 0.91, and the VOCI also shows good convergent and 
divergent validity (Thordarson et al., 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006).  Internal consistency for the 
contamination subscale in the contamination-fearful sample was α = .85.  
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI-II is a 





to items using a 0 to 3 scale indicating the severity or frequency of symptoms over the past two 
weeks.  Total scores can range from 0 to 63.  In the current study, the BDI-II was used in the 
contamination-fearful sample to determine severity of depressive symptoms; internal consistency 
was α = .94. 
Procedure 
Unselected student sample.  Participants received a link via e-mail to complete the 
aforementioned questionnaires after signing up for the study through an online participant pool.  
All questionnaires (see Measures) and questions regarding demographic information were 
administered via SelectSurvey, an online questionnaire software.  Additionally, a subset of 
participants was re-contacted after a four week delay to complete the BADI a second time in 
order to assess retest reliability.  Of the 130 participants who were asked to complete the BADI 
for retest, 81 completed the questionnaire (62%), with a mean retest interval of 30.96 (SD = 4.22) 
days. 
Contamination-fearful sample.  The contamination-fearful sample was comprised of 
both undergraduate students and community members.  Undergraduate participants completed an 
online screening questionnaire to assess for high levels of contamination fear, and were 
contacted and scheduled for the study if their responses exceeded a predetermined cut-off.  
Community participants were either contacted from a list of registry participants who have 
agreed to be contacted about studies in our laboratory, or responded to online ads.  These 
individuals then completed the screening measure over the phone, and were invited to participate 
if their responses met inclusion criteria.  The only additional inclusion criterion was scoring 14 
or higher on the VOCI-CTN subscale on the day of the study (see Participants), and 76 
individuals who presented at the lab did not meet this cut-off (these individuals were not 
included in the sample size listed above).  As mentioned above (see Participants), these 
individuals were participating in a study investigating a component of treatment for 
contamination fear.  Prior to the completion of any active components of the larger study, they 
completed a number of questionnaires, including the BADI.  
Results 
BADI Distraction Strategies Checklist 
Prior to completing the BADI, individuals selected typical strategies they use to distract 





include their own items.  Individuals selected an average of 4.70 items (SD = 2.00).  The number 
of items selected was significantly correlated with total scores on the BADI, r = .23, p < .001. 
Data Screening 
Unselected student sample.  Given that this study was administered through an online 
survey system that required a response to all items, there were no missing data.  Mahalanobis 
distance was calculated for items on the BADI using a chi-square cut-off of p < .001; a total of 
31 multivariate outliers were identified and removed from subsequent analyses.  Using 
Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) criteria of standardized scores exceeding +/- 3.29, no univariate 
outliers were identified on the BADI.  Thus the total sample retained for analysis was N = 475. 
Inspection of a histogram of total scores and calculations of skew and kurtosis (z = 0.93 
and 0.41, respectively) suggest a normal distribution of scores on the BADI.  The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test also suggested a normal distribution of scores on the BADI, D(475) = .04, p 
= .20, as did visual inspection of a Q-Q plot.  Therefore, there are no problems with normality 
present on the BADI.  Finally, multivariate normality was not assessed given the nonclinical 
nature of the sample (i.e., violations are unlikely and any changes would cause problems for 
ecological validity). 
Prior to conducting the factor analysis, all reverse-scored items (16 items) were removed 
due to potential measurement issues associated with the use of such items (e.g., Hazlett-Stevens, 
Ullman, & Craske, 2004; Rodebaugh, Woods, & Heimberg, 2007).  Next, correlations between 
remaining variables were inspected for problems (i.e., multicollinearity or lack of substantial 
correlations).  One item was removed for having very few substantial correlations (very few 
items correlating with other variables above r = 0.30; Field, 2009).  
Contamination-fearful sample.  The same screening process described above was used 
to screen data for the contamination-fearful sample prior to conducting a confirmatory factor 
analysis.  No univariate outliers were identified, and three multivariate outliers were identified 
and removed, leaving a final sample of N = 129.  Inspection of a histogram of total scores and 
calculation of skew and kurtosis (z = -0.14 and -0.33, respectively) suggest a normal distribution 
of scores on the BADI.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test also indicated a normal 






Exploratory factor analysis with unselected student sample.  An exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) using principal axis factoring (PAF) was conducted in order to assess the best fit 
factor structure for the BADI.  PAF was chosen because it often leads to more stable loadings, 
and generally outperforms maximum likelihood factor analysis (de Winter & Dodou, 2012).  
After removing outliers the final sample size was 475, which constitutes an acceptable sample 
size based on the typical suggested sample size of at least 300, or at least 10 participants per 
variable (for a review, see Field, 2009).  Inspection of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value verified 
adequate sample size for the analysis, KMO = .96, which falls in the ‘superb’ range (Field, 
2009).  Additionally, all KMO values for individual items had values greater than .80, with the 
majority exceeding .90, which is above the recommended level of .50 (Field, 2009).  Finally, 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2 (351) = 7447.74, p < .001, which indicates that 
intercorrelations between items were large enough for conducting EFA. 
An EFA with PAF was conducted on the 26 items that remained after removing reverse-
scored and problematic items (see Data Screening), and an oblique rotation was employed 
(Promax).  There were three factors with eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criteria of 1, together 
accounting for 57.25% of the variance, and scree plot inflexions indicated either a two- or three-
factor structure.  Given the relatively large sample size, scree plot inflexions were used as a basis 
for further analysis.  Complex items were classified as those with high loadings (r’s >.32) on 
multiple factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  When conducting the EFA using a three-factor 
structure, the third factor only contained two items, both of which were complex items, 
indicating that no items could be retained in this factor.  The two-factor solution contained only 
one complex item, and had a strong factor structure that made conceptual sense.  After removing 
the complex item (“I feel most comfortable if I am able to distract myself when I am nervous”) 
and one additional item that did not load on either factor (“If I distract myself, I can do things I 
would never be able to do otherwise”), the factor analysis was re-run and the resulting two-factor 
solution was retained (see Table 2).  A total of 24 items were retained in the final version of the 
scale following the aforementioned removal of complex items, with factor 1 containing 17 items, 
and factor 2 containing 7 items.  These two factors together accounted for 55.27% of the 
variance.  Finally, the two factors were interpretable, with factor 1 consisting of items describing 
distraction as necessary (Distraction is Necessary Subscale; BADI-N), and factor 2 consisting of 





Confirmatory factor analysis with contamination-fearful sample.  A confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted using the contamination-fearful sample.  After removing 
multivariate outliers, the resulting sample included 129 individuals.  There are a number of 
different recommendations for sample size in CFA, ranging from five participants per parameter 
(Bentler & Chou, 1987) to 15 cases per parameter (Stevens, 2009).  Another suggestion is that 
for models with more than ten parameters, samples sizes less than 200 are likely to produce 
unstable results (Loehlin, 1992).  The current sample is on the low end of acceptable participants 
per parameter at approximately five participants per parameter, which may lead to less stable 
results. 
A bootstrap procedure was used to test the two-factor solution resulting from the 
abovementioned EFA.  Model fit was evaluated through inspection of a number of fit indices, 
including the goodness of fit index (GFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), 
comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and parsimonious goodness of fit index 
(PGFI).  Additionally, the chi-square/degrees of freedom (relative chi-square index; CMIN/DF) 
was used because strictly utilizing the significance of the chi-square test does not typically 
provide an accurate representation of fit due to sample size (e.g., Bentler, 1990); on this index, 
scores below 2 represent good fit (Byrne, 1989).  Values above .90 on the GFI (Kline, 2011), 
CFI (Bentler, 1990), and TLI (Tucker & Lewis, 1973) indicate that a model demonstrates 
acceptable fit.  An RMSEA value of below .08 is considered acceptable, while values below .05 
are excellent (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).  Finally, PGFI values above .50 represent acceptable 
model fit (Mulaik et al., 1989). 
The initial iteration demonstrated somewhat poor fit overall with some indices in the 
ideal range (CMIN/DF = 1.86, RMSEA = .08, PGFI = .64), and other indices not meeting the 
suggested cut-offs (CFI = .88, GFI = .76, TLI = .87).  Inspection of modification indices 
indicated that the addition of several covariance paths between error terms might aid in 
improving model fit.  Three covariance paths were added for error terms within a single latent 
variable (for complete model, see Figure 1).  Following the addition of paths between error terms 
model fit improved and was adequate, with good or excellent fit on most indices, CMIN/DF = 








Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis of a two-factor model of the Beliefs about Distraction 











Reliability and Validity of the BADI in an Unselected Student Sample 
Internal consistency.  Internal consistency was calculated for the full-scale BADI as 
well as each of the two subscales.  The first factor of the BADI showed excellent reliability, 
while the second factor showed somewhat lower (but still very good) reliability (see Table 3).  
When considering the full-scale BADI of 24 items, reliability was excellent, α = .95.  
Retest reliability.  A subset of participants completed the BADI for a second time 
approximately four weeks after their initial participation in the study (see Procedure).    Retest 
reliability analyses showed that scores were stable over time, r = .78, p < .001.  However, scores 
on the BADI-N subscale were more stable (r = .80, p < .001) than scores on the BADI-E (r = .56, 
p < .001).  Finally, analyses were conducted to assess consistency in selection of distraction 
techniques that were chosen prior to completing the BADI.  At the second administration, 
individuals re-selected an average of 74% (SD = 24.44) of the items they selected at the first 
administration, and selected a mean of 1.52 (SD = 1.32) new items.  The number of items 
selected at the first time point was significantly correlated with the number of items selected at 
the second time point, r = .58, p < .001. 
Convergent validity.  Correlations between total and subscale scores on the BADI and 
existing measures of distraction were investigated in order to establish convergent validity.  
These existing measures included the distraction subscales of the CAQ and RSQ (CAQ-D and 
RSQ-D), the self-distraction subscale of the Brief COPE (COPE-D), and the blunting subscale of 
the MBQ (MBQ-B).  The CAQ-D, COPE-D, and MBQ-B were all significantly correlated with 
total BADI scores and scores on both BADI subscales; however, scores on the RSQ-D were 
significantly correlated with the BADI-E subscale only (see Table 3).  Therefore, it appears that 
the BADI displays adequate convergent validity. 
Relationship with general symptoms of anxiety and depression.  In order to assess 
whether scores on the BADI were related to symptoms of anxiety and depression, correlations 
were conducted with scores on the DASS and BAI.  Scores on all DASS subscales and the BAI 
correlated with the BADI and both BADI subscales (see Table 3).  It therefore appears that 
scores on the BADI are associated with symptoms of anxiety and depression. 
Divergent validity.  The monitoring subscale of the MBQ (MBQ-M) and the 







Means, Internal Consistency, and Correlations Between Total and Subscale Scores on the BADI 
With Predicted Convergent, Divergent, and Symptom Measures in Both the Unselected Student 
(EFA) and Contamination-Fearful (CFA) Samples 
 Unselected Student Sample (EFA)  
(n = 475) 
Contamination-Fearful Sample 
(CFA) (n = 129) 
 BADI BADI-N BADI-E BADI BADI-N BADI-E 
Convergent       
      CAQ-D .57*** .56*** .42*** - - - 
      COPE-SD .32*** .28*** .34*** - - - 
      RSQ-D -.02 -.03 .16** - - - 
      MBQ-B .21*** .18*** .22*** .32** .31** .25* 
Divergent       
      BFI-A -.17*** -.20*** .01 - - - 
      MBQ-M .03 .01 .10* -.07 -.10 .07 
Symptoms       
      DASS-D .36*** .40*** .14** - - - 
      DASS-A .40*** .43*** .16*** - - - 
      DASS-S .36*** .39*** .16*** - - - 
      BAI .40*** .43*** .17*** .36*** .40*** .13 
      BDI-II - - - .19* .24** -.02 
      VOCI-CTN - - - .22* .25** .06 
       
BADI-N .98*** - - .98*** - - 
BADI-E .73*** .58*** - .78*** .64*** - 
       













       
BADI α .95 .95 .85 .95 .94 .85 
Note. BADI = Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale 
of the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; CAQ-D = Distraction Subscale of the Cognitive Avoidance 
Questionnaire; COPE-SD = Self-Distraction Subscale of the Brief COPE; RSQ-D = Distraction 
Subscale of the Response Styles Questionnaire; MBQ-B = Blunting Subscale of the Monitoring 
Blunting Questionnaire; BFI-A = Agreeableness Subscale of the Big Five Inventory; MBQ-M = 
Monitoring Subscale of the Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire; DASS-D = Depression Subscale 
of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21; DASS-A = Anxiety Subscale of the Depression 





21; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; VOCI-CTN = 
Contamination Subscale of the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory. * p < .05; ** p < 

































total and subscale scores and MBQ-M were not significantly correlated, and the BFI-A was 
significantly negatively correlated with total BADI and BADI-N subscale scores, but not with 
BADI-E subscale scores (see Table 3).  Given that BFI-A scores were correlated with BADI and 
BADI-N subscale scores, t-tests for dependent correlations were conducted in order to establish 
whether these associations were as strong as correlations with divergent measures.  Scores on the 
BADI are more strongly correlated with CAQ-D scores than BFI-A scores, t(474) = 13.13, p 
<.001, and a similar relationship was observed for BADI-N subscale scores, t(474) = 13.64, p 
<.001.  Therefore, although BFI-A scores were correlated with the BADI and one of the 
subscales, the correlations between the BADI and a predicted convergent measure were 
significantly stronger. 
Reliability and Validity of the BADI in the Contamination-Fearful Sample 
Internal consistency for the BADI in the contamination-fearful sample was excellent, α = 
.95.  Factor scores for the BADI-N and BADI-E also exhibited strong internal consistency, α = 
.94 and .85, respectively.  Convergent validity was confirmed using MBQ-B scores, while 
divergent validity was confirmed using MBQ-M scores (see Table 3).  Total BADI scores and 
BADI-N scores correlated with symptoms of depression, general anxiety, and contamination 
fear, whereas BADI-E scores did not correlate with these symptoms.  Overall relationships were 
similar to those seen in the nonclinical EFA sample, except that BADI-E scores were not 
correlated with symptoms of psychopathology in the CFA (contamination-fearful) sample. 
Discussion 
This study involved creating and validating a measure of maladaptive beliefs about 
distraction when in anxiety-provoking situations, namely the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory 
(BADI).  Given that there were no specific hypotheses regarding the number of factors, an 
exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring was conducted.  Analyses revealed a 
two-factor structure, including Distraction Is Necessary (BADI-N) and Distraction Is Effective 
(BADI-E) subscales.  The BADI-N factor consisted of 17 items related to the belief that 
distraction is necessary in order to make it through anxiety provoking situations, and the BADI-E 
factor consisted of seven items related to the belief that distraction is effective in reducing 
anxiety.  The ability to distinguish between these two sets of beliefs is of theoretical importance, 
as reliance on distraction (reflected in the BADI-N subscale) may be more problematic than a 





subscale); indeed, from the perspective of the patient or client, when distraction does succeed in 
reducing anxiety during difficult or challenging situations, it is both successful and effective.  
Total BADI scores and scores on both BADI subscales were related to existing measures of 
distraction use as well as general symptoms of anxiety and depression.  Overall the BADI was 
found to be a reliable and valid measure with excellent internal consistency and good retest 
reliability (although only moderate retest reliability was observed for the BADI-E subscale). 
As predicted, the BADI and its subscales were positively correlated with measures 
assessing frequency of distraction use during anxiety-provoking situations, in both the unselected 
and contamination-fearful samples.  It is not surprising that individuals who frequently use 
distraction would also hold beliefs that distraction is necessary and effective.  However, the 
distraction subscale of the RSQ (administered in the unselected student sample), which assesses 
coping strategies for depression, was only significantly correlated with the BADI-E subscale.  
Therefore, the use of distraction when depressed appears to be related to the belief that 
distraction is an effective tool to cope with anxiety, which may indicate that distraction can be 
viewed as an effective tool across a number of emotional states.  Conversely, if an individual 
holds the belief that distraction is necessary to cope with anxiety, this may not directly relate to 
whether or not they use distraction when depressed.  It is worth noting that although the self-
distraction subscale of the COPE was correlated with BADI scores, the internal consistency for 
this subscale was very low in the current sample (α = .42), limiting the interpretability of this 
relationship.  Finally, the number of items selected from the provided list of distraction 
techniques was significantly correlated with total BADI scores, suggesting that individuals who 
implement a broader range of distraction techniques when faced with anxiety appear to hold 
stronger maladaptive beliefs about distraction.  This provides further support for the relationship 
between BADI scores and other measures of distraction use that assess frequency of distraction 
use. 
Scores on the BADI and its subscales were also significantly correlated with measures of 
general anxious and depressive symptomatology in the unselected student sample, although 
correlations with the BADI-E subscale were of a smaller magnitude.  In the contamination-
fearful sample, symptoms of anxiety, depression, and contamination fear were related to BADI 
and BADI-N, but not to BADI-E scores.  It makes theoretical sense that correlations between 





BADI-N subscales, as the belief that distraction is necessary may relate more to psychopathology 
than simply the belief that distraction is effective or useful.  In this regard, holding the belief that 
distraction is effective may not necessarily be maladaptive.  The relationship of BADI and 
BADI-N scores with measures of psychopathology could either be due to increased need for 
coping strategies related to high levels of anxiety, or due to an increase in symptom presentation 
over time following consistent use of distraction when anxious.  The direction of this relationship 
should be clarified through further (likely experimental) investigations.  It is also worth noting 
that the observed relationship between BADI scores and other forms of negative affect (e.g., 
depression, stress) makes theoretical sense, given that individuals may turn to distraction to deal 
with a range of negative emotional states. 
Finally, when considering measures predicted to be unrelated to distraction-related 
beliefs, the BADI was not related to scores on the monitoring subscale of the MBQ in the 
unselected or contamination-fearful samples.  However, scores on the agreeableness subscale of 
the BFI (BFI-A) administered in the unselected student sample were negatively correlated with 
total BADI and BADI-N scores (but not the BADI-E subscale).  Further analysis confirmed that 
associations between both the total BADI and BADI-N scores and the distraction subscale of the 
CAQ were of a larger magnitude than associations with the BFI-A.  Therefore, measures that 
were predicted to be unrelated to BADI scores were either not correlated with the BADI, or were 
correlated to a lesser degree than measures that were predicted to relate to the BADI.    
A contamination-fearful sample was used to conduct a CFA using the proposed factor 
structure identified through the EFA.  The final iteration of this CFA showed adequate model fit, 
although some values were slightly below the suggested cut-offs.  It is possible that better fit 
may have been established with a larger sample.  However, results of the CFA support the 
preliminary factor structure of the BADI, and scores in the contamination-fearful sample 
correlate with divergent and convergent measures as well as with measures of psychopathology 
to a similar degree as the correlations seen in the undergraduate EFA sample.   
Overall it appears that the BADI is a reliable and valid measure; however, the BADI-E 
subscale has fewer items and somewhat less strong psychometric properties than the BADI-N 
subscale.  It is possible that the BADI-E subscale, which appears to be less related to 
psychopathology, has a wider range of scores across individuals.  The fact that BADI-E scores 





Interestingly, BADI-E scores were correlated with psychopathology in the unselected student 
sample, but not in the contamination-fearful sample.  It is possible that the larger sample size in 
the unselected student sample may have allowed for associations to be observed, or that the 
larger range of scores may have influenced the ability to observe this relationship.  It would be 
interesting to see if a similar pattern is observed in future studies using the BADI.   
While this study has promising results, there are some notable limitations.  The EFA 
included an undergraduate student sample, and it is possible that individuals with lower levels of 
anxiety may have different perceptions of the necessity of distraction use than those with more 
severe levels of anxiety, limiting generalizability to a clinical and/or treatment-seeking sample.  
The CFA used a specific contamination-fearful sample with unconfirmed clinical status (and a 
small sample size); this focus on only one specific type of anxiety may limit our understanding 
of the factor structure in a generally anxious sample.  It may be interesting to assess whether 
distraction-related beliefs differ across different types of anxiety.  Additionally, both the EFA 
and CFA samples were predominantly comprised of Caucasian women, further limiting 
generalizability to other populations.  In summary, this is the first attempt to our knowledge to 
create a measure assessing maladaptive beliefs about distraction use, but replication (including a 
confirmatory factor analysis using a larger sample and more diverse clinical samples) is 
recommended in order to confirm and extend the current results. 
The instructions for the BADI ask individuals to reflect on strategies they use to distract 
themselves when anxious, but do not ask individuals to report the types of anxiety-provoking 
situations they considered.  Given that individuals may be considering different forms of anxiety 
when responding to this questionnaire, this may not lead to equivalent perceived need for 
distraction.  Indeed, it is possible that the use of or reliance upon distraction when dealing with 
general daily anxiety may not be as detrimental as its use when dealing with anxiety associated 
with an anxiety disorder diagnosis.  Additionally, although individuals are asked to select items 
from a list of distraction techniques prior to responding to items on the BADI, this list is not 
comprehensive.  While some individuals may consider additional strategies, others may feel 
limited to considering only provided items.  However, many individuals in the current study 
elected to add their own distraction techniques in addition to those listed.  Individuals also 
selected an average of 4 to 5 items from the list, further supporting that a range of techniques 





the questionnaire with the same strategy, we can assume that they were at least considering 
distraction in a similar manner. 
Having an accurate measure of maladaptive distraction-related beliefs may be clinically 
useful in terms of understanding the impact that these beliefs have on treatment outcome during 
CBT.  This may be important given high rates of treatment refusal and drop-out, which may in 
part reflect a need for treatment-enhancing variables.  For example, in a study by Bados, 
Balaguer, and Saldaña (2007), approximately 44% of the individuals who began treatment 
dropped out.  Of these individuals, 67% provided a reason for dropping out, 47% of which 
reported that they dropped out due to low motivation or being dissatisfied with the treatment or 
therapist.  Of course it is difficult to know the proportion of individuals who would endorse 
having discontinued treatment due to disliking the treatment (or exposure specifically).  
However, given the possibility that drop-out and refusal rates in CBT may in part be high due to 
the anxiety-provoking nature of exposure (e.g., Veale, 1999), the addition of techniques that 
might aid in diminishing anxiety may be a helpful method by which to increase treatment 
acceptability.  Bandura (1977; 1988) suggested that distraction may aid in fear reduction.  
Specifically, individuals often gauge their ability to cope based on their level of physiological 
arousal, so a reduction in physiological arousal due to distraction may in fact aid both in 
increasing self-efficacy and facilitating fear reduction.  However, results from experimental 
studies of distraction use during exposure have been mixed, highlighting the importance of 
learning more about factors that may be related to these discrepant results.   
Given that individual differences in beliefs about distraction may be one relevant factor, 
it is important that we have an accurate measure of this construct.  Importantly, it has been 
suggested that the use of coping strategies (which may include distraction) out of necessity may 
be problematic in the long-term (e.g., Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  If an individual tends to rely 
on distraction in their daily life, it is important to understand whether this reliance impacts their 
general response to treatment, and whether distraction is harmful or helpful for this individual 
during exposure.  For example, individuals who rely on distraction may benefit from being 
advised against using distraction during exposure, while the same advice may be harmful for 
individuals who do not rely on distraction.  The results of the current study suggest that beliefs 
that distraction is necessary may be more associated with symptoms of psychological distress 





indicator for reducing distraction during exposure; the belief that distraction is effective may not 
be indicative of such a need; of course, this is an empirical question.   
More research is needed to further investigate how maladaptive beliefs about distraction 
may relate to treatment outcome.  Future research should confirm the factor structure of the 
BADI, and begin to investigate the impact that maladaptive beliefs about distraction may have 
on treatment outcome.  For example, it is possible that maladaptive beliefs about distraction may 
have a negative impact on treatment outcome, but this has not been investigated.  If maladaptive 
beliefs about distraction have a negative impact on treatment, these beliefs could be more 
explicitly targeted in order to improve treatment outcome.  Therefore, it would be useful to look 
at how BADI scores relate to treatment as usual, how these beliefs impact treatment outcome 
when distraction is utilized (and when it is discouraged), and whether changes in maladaptive 
beliefs about distraction occur following successful treatment. 
Although there are some limitations, the current study presents a novel attempt to assess 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction use, which may be an important and informative area for 
study with potential for impacting treatment recommendations for anxiety.  Although a number 
of questionnaires have been developed that include subscales assessing whether individuals use 
distraction, these do not address underlying beliefs about distraction which may be important.  
Thus the current study provides a novel understanding of two possible belief domains that may 
drive individuals to use distraction, factors which may hold more importance than simply those 


















 There has been much debate over the past few decades regarding the impact of distraction 
use on exposure outcome.  Given the wealth of discrepant experimental results, specific factors 
related to distraction may need to be investigated in more detail in order to illuminate what 
impact distraction has on exposure outcome, and for whom this impact may be greatest.  Study 1 
focused on the development and validation of a measure of maladaptive beliefs about distraction 
(the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI).  Items were generated with the goal of 
including statements reflecting that distraction is necessary to cope with anxiety, that distraction 
is an effective or useful strategy, and how often an individual resorts to distraction use when 
anxious. 
 The factor structure and psychometric properties of the BADI were first evaluated in an 
unselected student sample using exploratory factor analysis.  Results indicated a two-factor 
structure, one related to distraction being necessary (BADI-N), and one related to distraction 
being effective (BADI-E).  The BADI exhibited acceptable internal consistency, retest reliability, 
and convergent and divergent validity.  Scores on the BADI also correlated with measures of 
general anxiety, depression, and stress, although the correlations of these measures with the 
BADI-E subscale were not as strong.  Subsequently, a confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted with a contamination-fearful sample.  Results generally suggested adequate model fit, 
and correlations with convergent and divergent measures were similar in magnitude to those 
obtained in the exploratory factor analysis.  Correlations between symptoms of psychopathology 
and the two different BADI factors showed a similar pattern to that mentioned above, although 
the difference was more robust in the contamination-fearful sample.  Specifically, while 
symptoms of psychopathology were significantly correlated with BADI-N subscale scores, they 
were not significantly correlated with BADI-E subscale scores.  It is possible that beliefs that 
distraction is necessary or essential are more related to psychopathology than beliefs that 
distraction is effective or can be helpful. 
 The beliefs an individual holds about distraction, particularly if they have a strong 
reliance on distraction, may be an important factor to consideration in the potential use of 
distraction during exposure.  However, very little is known about the impact these beliefs may 





that can be used in future studies, a first and important step to being able to understand whether 
and how these beliefs may affect treatment.  (Of note, the BADI was also administered in a study 
of distraction during exposure, and the associated results are briefly presented in Chapter 5).  
Investigating idiosyncratic beliefs about distraction is one possible avenue to gain further 
understanding as to when distraction should or should not be utilized, and will be important to 
continue investigating in the future.  First, however, it will be important to see if distraction is 
beneficial or harmful in exposure more generally through consideration of other possible 
explanations for the discrepancies in the extant literature. 
 One important issue that warrants attention is the apparent variability in distraction tasks 
that have been employed in previous experiments.  Although numerous factors may be relevant 
to consider when investigating design differences across studies, one such factor was 
investigated in Study 2: the level of cognitive load involved in distraction tasks.  The first 
experiment conducted in Study 2 involved validating potential distraction tasks to use in the 
second experiment, which consisted of completing an exposure session while utilizing various 
levels of distraction (or no distraction).  Differences in exposure outcome were investigated, but 
another central research question pertained to whether the use of distraction may actually lead to 
greater changes in self-efficacy or greater perceived acceptability of treatment.  These factors are 
being investigated due to high levels of treatment refusal and drop-out for exposure therapy (e.g., 
Bados, Balaguer, & Saldaña, 2007), and thus a need for elucidating methods by which to 

















Too Little, Too Much, or Just Right? Does the Amount of Distraction Make a 
Difference during Contamination-Related Exposure? 
When faced with anxiety-provoking situations, individuals often attempt to reduce their 
distress through the use of distraction strategies.  These strategies are typically employed in order 
to distance oneself from a feared situation through reduced visual or cognitive attention.  
Although it has been suggested that distraction during exposure interferes with emotional 
processing (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rachman, 1980) by reducing attentional focus (e.g., 
Barlow, 1988), others have asserted that fear reduction can occur through other means (see 
Rachman, 2015).  For example, Bandura (1977, 1988) proposed that fear reduction can occur 
following mastery over a situation, resulting in increased self-confidence, self-efficacy, and 
perceived ability to conquer tasks.  Individuals often use emotional arousal as a measure of 
coping ability, and the use of distraction may aid in reducing arousal, thereby increasing feelings 
of accomplishment.  It has thus been argued that increased self-efficacy may relate to fear 
reduction, and importantly that distraction does not necessarily impede (and may in fact aid in) 
this process.  Furthermore, cognitive accounts of fear reduction during exposure postulate that 
disconfirmation of catastrophic beliefs plays a central role in exposure outcome.  Salkovskis 
(1991) suggested that the use of strategies that decrease anxiety in a situation will not interfere 
with fear disconfirmation, as helping manage anxiety does not inherently block the ability to 
obtain disconfirmatory evidence.  Although these (and other) theories do not predict a negative 
impact associated with distraction use, it remains important to understand when, how, and for 
whom the use of distraction may be appropriate.  Furthermore, given a recent focus on treatment 
acceptability (e.g., Milosevic, Levy, Alcolado, & Radomsky, in press), it may be useful to 
investigate whether distraction may be another avenue by which to increase acceptability. 
Although many studies have investigated the possible utility of distraction during 
exposure, results are inconsistent.  While some studies show no difference in treatment outcome 
when distraction is used versus when it is not (e.g., Antony et al., 2001; Rose & McGlynn, 
1997), others show that distraction impedes fear reduction within (e.g., Kamphuis & Telch, 
2000; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995) and between sessions (e.g., Craske, Street, & Barlow, 1989; 
Kamphuis & Telch, 2000), while others show that distraction can aid in fear reduction within 





Page, 1999) and between sessions (e.g., Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 2003, 2008).  
Given these discrepant results, it is important to investigate specific factors that may influence 
outcome.  Although several aspects may be relevant, one potentially important factor relates to 
the level of difficulty (i.e., cognitive load) of the distraction tasks that are utilized (e.g., 
Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Podină, Koster, Philippot, Dethier, & David, 2013; Rodriguez & 
Craske, 1993, 1995; Telch et al., 2004). 
Studies investigating distraction use during exposure have employed a wide variety of 
distraction tasks with differing levels of complexity.  For example, distraction tasks have 
included reading words aloud (e.g., Haw & Dickerson, 1998), viewing images (e.g., Rodriguez 
& Craske, 1995), playing video games (e.g., Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1982, 1986), 
conversational tasks (e.g., Oliver & Page, 2003), and completing complex mathematical tasks 
(e.g., Kamphuis & Telch, 2000).  Careful consideration of task-related differences may be central 
to understanding the role of distraction during exposure, given that varied levels and forms of 
distraction may lead to diverse outcomes.  Specifically, the amount of cognitive resources 
necessary to engage in distraction tasks (i.e., cognitive load or working memory taxation) will 
inherently differ based on task complexity.  Working memory refers to the memorial system 
responsible for holding, manipulating, and processing information (see Baddeley, 1992); when 
working memory is taxed, resources are being utilized at close to their capacity.  When a task 
involves greater levels of cognitive load, fewer cognitive resources are available to process other 
aspects of one’s environment and experience.  It is possible that if distraction tasks involve 
differing levels of working memory taxation or cognitive load, variable levels of resources would 
remain available to comprehensively process the exposure, including fear-related learning and 
memory encoding, could therefore be affected.   
The effect of cognitive load on exposure outcome has been established as a likely 
mechanism underlying the effects of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), a 
treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; e.g., Bisson et al., 2007).  EMDR involves the 
visualization of past traumatic experiences (i.e., imaginal exposure) while focusing on the 
therapist’s finger moving back and forth (Shapiro, 1995).  Some have questioned whether the 
exposure component is the active ingredient in EMDR, or whether eye movements add 
something unique.  While some have reported that exposure is the active ingredient in EMDR 





EMDR includes the theorized treatment enhancing role of eye movements.  Specifically, Shapiro 
(1989) argued that exposure alone was insufficient, and that eye movements appeared to be a 
helpful component in fear reduction.  In a study by Lee, Taylor, and Drummond (2006), 
qualitative coding of the content of imaginal exposure alone or with eye movements indicated 
that when individuals processed trauma in a detached fashion they showed greater improvement; 
detachment was identified as a specific consequence of EMDR.  Importantly, more recent studies 
have established that the efficacy of EMDR may relate to the eye movements taxing working 
memory or increasing cognitive load (Engelhard, van den Hout, Janssen, & van der Beek, 2010; 
Engelhard et al., 2011; van den Hout & Engelhard, 2012; van den Hout et al., 2010). 
It is proposed that given the limited capacity of working memory (Miller, 1956), 
engaging in a task that utilizes a portion of this capacity while concurrently imagining distressing 
memories will result in less resource allocation to the distressing memory, thus reducing 
vividness and emotionality of the memory during recoding.  In support of this hypothesis, 
variable tasks that tax working memory (using methods other than eye movements) have been 
investigated and exhibit similar results to eye movements, including counting tasks (van den 
Hout et al., 2010), auditory shadowing (Gunter & Bodner, 2008), and drawing a complex figure 
(Gunter & Bodner, 2008).  Tasks that appear to utilize very few working memory resources (e.g., 
finger tapping) do not enhance treatment outcome, and thus perform at a similar level to imaginal 
exposure without eye movements (van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001).  
Furthermore, it has been theorized that the dose-response curve related to working memory 
taxation may exhibit an inverted U-shape, with too little or too much taxation not aiding in 
reductions of vividness or emotionality.  For example, when working memory is highly taxed, 
insufficient resources are available to successfully hold the distressing memory in one’s mind 
while also performing the working memory task (Engelhard, van den Hout, Janssen, & van der 
Beek, 2010); thus, reductions in vividness and emotionality no longer result. 
If working memory is taxed during an anxiety-provoking experience (e.g., an exposure 
session), the emotionality of the experience may be less intense and less vivid, thus leading to 
encoding the event as less distressing.  Theoretically, this suggests that differing levels of 
cognitive load during exposure may in fact lead to altered levels of processing of treatment 
components.  In order to experimentally investigate this theory, the two studies presented below 





exposure outcome.  The first experiment aimed to assess the level of cognitive load of a number 
of different tasks in order to select appropriate distraction tasks for the second study, which 
investigated the effect of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome in a contamination-
fearful sample.  It was hypothesized that moderate levels of distraction during exposure would 
enhance fear reduction compared to a no distraction control, and that high levels of distraction 
would interfere with fear reduction. 
Another important question was whether the use of distraction would be associated with 
higher levels of treatment acceptability.  To our knowledge, the acceptability of treatment with or 
without the use of distraction has yet to be investigated; however, distraction is often construed 
as a type of covert safety behaviour, and recent work has begun to focus on the potential 
acceptability-enhancing role of the use of safety behaviour in treatment.  Specifically, 
preliminary studies have established that the use of safety behaviour may increase treatment 
acceptability, both experimentally in a student sample (Levy & Radomsky, 2014), and via 
treatment vignettes rated by both student (Levy, Senn, & Radomsky, 2014; Milosevic & 
Radomsky, 2013a) and clinical (Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013a) samples.  Therefore, we also 
assessed treatment acceptability following an exposure session with or without distraction 
(Experiment 2), and hypothesized that treatment acceptability would be rated highest in 
conditions using moderate and high levels of distraction.     
Experiment 1 
 This study aimed to establish the level of cognitive load associated with five different 
distraction tasks to determine which would best represent three differing levels of cognitive load: 
low, moderate, and high.  We predicted that seemingly more complex tasks would lead to higher 
levels of cognitive load.  Cognitive load was assessed by measuring change in reaction time on a 
computerized task when completing concurrent tasks, with greater reaction times indicating 
greater cognitive load.  We also predicted that subjective cognitive load (i.e., self-reported task 
difficulty) would correlate with objective cognitive load (i.e., changes in reaction time). 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were (N = 180) undergraduate students who completed the 
study in exchange for course credit.  Following the exclusion of four participants (see below), 
data from 176 participants were retained.  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 51 years, with a 





Caucasian (66%).  There were no significant differences between conditions in terms of age, F(4, 
175) = 1.33, p = .26, partial η² = .04, or sex, χ2(4) = 2.60, p = .63.   
Measures   
Discrimination reaction time task.  Participants completed a simple computer-based 
reaction time task during practice, baseline, and test phases.  Individuals were instructed to press 
the ‘left shift’ key if they saw a circle and the ‘right shift’ key if they saw a triangle.  This 
procedure was based on a reaction time task used by van den Hout and colleagues (2010) to 
establish cognitive load and working memory taxation.  Inter-stimulus intervals were random 
and ranged from 2.2 to 3 seconds.  The stimulus remained on the screen until a response was 
recorded.  The practice phase consisted of 12 trials to orient participants to the task.  During the 
baseline phase 48 reactions were recorded over approximately three minutes, and during the test 
phase 84 reactions were recorded over approximately five minutes.   
Cognitive load questions.  Participants were asked to respond to four items created for 
the purposes of this study which aimed to assess perceived cognitive load (i.e., working memory 
taxation) during the study.  Specifically, participants used a 10-point Likert-type scale (0 = not at 
all and 9 = completely) to indicate to what extent they had to use mental effort to complete the 
task, how much attention was required, how difficult was it to focus on the computer task, and 
how distracting they found the verbal task to be.  The internal consistency for the total sample 
was α = .89, with internal consistencies by condition ranging from α = .75 to .89. 
Materials.  The computerized reaction time task was displayed on a 30 cm by 48 cm 
monitor.  Stimuli were white shapes (2.5 cm in diameter) presented in the center of a black 
screen.  Participants used a standard keyboard to respond to stimuli, with the ‘left shift’ and 
‘right shift’ keys clearly labeled as ‘LEFT’ and ‘RIGHT’, respectively. 
Procedure.  Participants first completed a brief training phase to ensure they understood 
the reaction time task.  They then completed a baseline reaction time task (baseline phase) 
followed by concurrently completing the reaction time task and one of five randomly assigned 
verbal distraction tasks (test phase).  The five tasks are described below in ascending order of 
predicted complexity (i.e., cognitive load).  Task 1 involved repeating words (e.g., full, night, 
room) read aloud by the experimenter.  Task 2 involved naming the colour of items (e.g., lemon, 
flamingo, cotton) read aloud by the experimenter.  Task 3 involved a conversation about goals, 





procedural descriptions of how to complete tasks (e.g., making dinner, getting ready for bed).  
Task 5 involved the same conversation task as Task 3, but participants were also instructed to 
say ”three” after every third word they said.  This portion of the study was audio-recorded for 
reliability purposes.  After completing the test phase, participants responded to questions about 
perceived cognitive load. 
Data analyses.  Change in reaction time from baseline to test phase was used as an index 
of cognitive load for each task (i.e., more slowed reaction times would relate to more taxing 
tasks).  The main outcome variables were change in reaction time (mean of test phase – mean of 
baseline phase) and percent change in reaction time ((mean of test phase – mean of baseline 
phase)/mean of baseline phase), which takes initial reaction time performance into account. 
Results 
Data screening and cleaning.  First, all reaction times associated with incorrect 
responses were removed (coded as missing).  Mean reaction times were then calculated for each 
participant for baseline and test phases, as well as change in reaction time and percent change in 
reaction time.  There were four outliers on baseline performance: two with low accuracy, and 
two with slow reaction times.  Given that baseline performance for these four individuals was 
different than average, they were removed from subsequent analyses. 
 Outliers for the reaction times during the test phase (and change and percent change in 
reaction time) were evaluated within groups rather than the total sample, given that reaction 
times were likely to differ across groups.  For change in reaction time, four outliers were 
identified, and for percent change in reaction time, three outliers were identified.  Outliers on 
these variables were not removed given that variable response times were important to the study 
hypotheses.  However, given that outlying scores may impact analyses, all outlying scores were 
converted to the corresponding score of the next highest Z-score in that condition. 
Manipulation check.  A blind rater listened to 20-second segments of each audio-
recording and predicted each participant’s condition assignment.  All recordings (100%) were 
identified as belonging to the correct condition. 
Overall analyses.  Prior to conducting change and percent change analyses, a 2 (time) by 
5 (condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted in order to investigate condition differences in 
reaction times at baseline and test periods.  There was a main effect of condition, F(4, 175) = 





.53, and a significant time by condition interaction, F(4, 175) = 16.00, p <.001, partial η² = .27.  
The observed interaction (see Figure 2) indicated that as predicted task complexity increased, the 
difference between baseline and test phase reaction times increased. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted in order to investigate condition differences in 
change and percent change in reaction time.  Mean change and percent change in reaction time 
by condition are presented in Table 4, and mean reaction times at baseline and test are displayed 
in Figure 2.  Overall, the hypothesized order of task complexity was largely supported.  For 
change in reaction time, there was a significant difference between conditions, F(4, 175) = 22.25, 
p <.001, partial η² = .34.  Post hoc analyses using a Bonferroni correction indicated significant 
differences between all conditions except for conditions 2 and 3, and a trend towards a 
significant difference between conditions 1 and 2.  For percent change in reaction time, there was 
a significant difference between conditions, F(4, 175) = 20.14, p <.001, partial η² = .32.  Post hoc 
analyses using a Bonferroni correction indicated significant differences between all conditions 
except for conditions 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4.  Therefore, considering both outcome 
variables, there were significant differences between conditions 1, 3, and 5 (see Table 4). 
Subjective cognitive load.  A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate condition 
differences on self-reported cognitive load.  Results showed a significant difference between 
conditions, F(4, 175) = 15.98, p < .001, with post-hoc analyses using a Bonferroni correction  
showing no differences between conditions 2, 3, and 4, but significant differences between all 
other condition pairs (p’s < .048).  Therefore, subjective cognitive load was significantly 
different between conditions 1, 3 and 5. 
Correlation between self-reported taxation and reaction time changes.  Mean 
responses on self-reported cognitive load questions were correlated with mean reaction time at 
test period, change in reaction time, and percent change in reaction time.  Self-reported cognitive 
load was significantly associated with mean reaction time at test period, r = .38, p < .001, change 
in reaction time from baseline to test period, r = .45, p < .001, and percent change in reaction 
time from baseline to test period, r = .41, p < .001.  Therefore, when considering each of three 
values representing objective cognitive load, subjective measures of cognitive load were 








Figure 2. Mean reaction times during baseline and test phases, by condition in Experiment 1.  















































Reaction Time by Condition and Time, and Change and Percent Change in Reaction Time by 
Condition in Experiment 1 
 Condition 
 1 2 3 4 5 




















































































Note. All reaction times are reported in milliseconds; 1 = Condition 1 (word repetition); 2 = 
Condition 2 (colour naming); 3 = Condition 3 (conversation); 4 = Condition 4 (procedural 
descriptions); 5 = Condition 5 (conversation with threes); Baseline = baseline phase; Test = test 
phase; Change = change in reaction time from baseline to test phase; Percent change = percent 
change in reaction time from baseline to test phase (since individuals often at least doubled or 
even tripled their reaction time from baseline to test period, many mean percentage values 
exceed a 100% increase); within each row, values that share the same superscripted letter did not 
















The level of cognitive load associated with the five verbal distraction tasks evaluated in 
this experiment followed the hypothesized pattern of results, with seemingly more complex tasks 
largely leading to higher levels of objective cognitive load (i.e., greater increases in reaction 
time).  For subjective (i.e., self-reported) cognitive load, a similar pattern of results was 
observed, although the three tasks in the moderate range (i.e., tasks 2, 3, and 4) did not differ 
significantly from one another.  Importantly, self-reported and objective ratings of cognitive load 
were correlated, suggesting that individuals were relatively accurate at evaluating their 
experience.  These results are promising given the difficulty associated with concurrently 
completing a distraction task, an objective measure of cognitive load for that task, and an 
exposure exercise.  In other words, self-reported cognitive load appeared to act as a reasonable 
proxy for objective cognitive load, and can therefore be utilized as a measure of cognitive load in 
upcoming studies. 
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess specific tasks for Experiment 2, 
evaluating the impact of cognitive load on exposure outcome.  It was determined that tasks 1, 3 
and 5 could be categorized as having low, moderate, and high levels of cognitive load, 
respectively.  Specifically, there were significant differences in reaction time changes between 
each of these conditions, such that each task utilized a different amount of cognitive resources.  
By experimentally establishing levels of task complexity, more accurate conclusions can be 
drawn in later studies that utilize these tasks.   
This study had a number of limitations that are worth mentioning.  First, although 
reaction time was measured during both baseline and test phases (with the baseline phase serving 
as a control), no control group (i.e., with no distraction task during the test phase) was included.  
It is possible that fatigue effects and/or practice effects may have impacted reaction times during 
the test phase.  However, the question addressed in this study related to differences between 
distraction tasks rather than specific differences from baseline.  Second, the reaction time task 
was quite simple.  Although this may have allowed for more clear differences between 
conditions, it may not generalize to more complex tasks, such as exposure.  It is unclear whether 
the same magnitude of results would have been observed with a more complex reaction time 
task.  Another potential limitation is that participants were not given specific instructions 





may have approached the tasks with different goals.  Additionally, during the reaction time task, 
the symbol remained on the screen until a response was indicated (i.e., there was no response 
time limit), which limited the ability to interpret accuracy-related results.  Finally, while the tasks 
have been categorized as having low, moderate, and high levels of cognitive load, it is possible 
that more and less cognitively demanding tasks exist, and thus the selected tasks may not 
necessarily represent the full range of possible levels of cognitive load. 
Despite these limitations, this study was able to experimentally validate a number of 
verbal distraction tasks with respect to cognitive load.  These results highlight the importance of 
considering the type of distraction tasks used in research, given that tasks varied significantly in 
terms of how much effort was required to complete them.  These tasks can now be utilized to 
evaluate the impact of distraction during exposure with empirically-established differences in 
distraction task complexity. 
Experiment 2 
 This study aimed to assess whether level of distraction impacted exposure outcome.  The 
tasks that were validated in Experiment 1 were used to create conditions of low, moderate, and 
high distraction (previous tasks 1, 3 and 5, respectively), which were evaluated against a no 
distraction control.  We predicted that individuals would show the greatest improvement when a 
moderate level of distraction was employed, that no distraction and low distraction would lead to 
similar outcomes, and that individuals who used a high level of distraction would show the least 
improvement due to the fact that they were too distracted to benefit from the exposure.   
Additionally, this study investigated the impact of distraction use on perceived 
acceptability of treatment and changes in self-efficacy over the course of an exposure session.  
Given that recent research has suggested that the use of safety behaviour may enhance the 
acceptability of treatment (e.g., Levy & Radomsky, 2014; Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013a), and 
that distraction is often considered a covert form of safety behaviour, it was predicted that 
individuals using at least a moderate level of distraction would rate the acceptability of the 
exposure session higher than individuals who did not use distraction.  Furthermore, it was 
predicted that increases in self-efficacy would be greatest for the moderate distraction condition.  
Greater increases in self-efficacy have been observed in previous studies in conditions using 
distraction compared to focused exposure (e.g., Johnstone & Page, 2004).  This relates to 





physiological arousal which leads to more positive perceptions of coping ability.  However, the 
same degree of change in self-efficacy was not expected when individuals were highly distracted 
due to the fact that less overall improvement was predicted to occur in this condition due to the 
high level of distraction employed. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were members of the community with subclinical levels of 
contamination fear who participated in exchange for financial compensation, or undergraduate 
students with subclinical levels of contamination fear who participated in exchange for course 
credit or financial compensation.  Community members were either recruited through our pre-
existing registry of clinical participants or responded to online advertisements, and 
undergraduate participants were recruited through an online participant pool.  All participants 
were pre-screened for high levels of contamination fear, and were invited to participate if their 
responses met inclusion criteria (see Procedure).  Additionally, participants had to remain 
eligible following a final in-lab screening to complete the entire study.   
A total of 124 individuals were eligible for and participated in the study, 103 (83%) of 
whom were recruited as part of the undergraduate sample.  Participants had a mean age of 24.85 
(SD = 8.29) years.  The majority was female (n = 114, 92%) and identified as Caucasian (n = 64, 
52%).  Mean scores on measures of contamination fear were representative of a fearful sample, 
and are reported in Table 5.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (see 
Procedure), and there were no condition differences in terms of age, sex, or symptoms of 
depression, or contamination fear (see Table 5).  One participant (in the control condition) 
dropped out of the study during the exposure session due to their anxiety.  Additionally, three 
individuals did not return for the second visit, and therefore were excluded from analyses 
assessing change from post-exposure to follow-up. 
Measures 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004).  The 
VOCI is a 55-item questionnaire that assesses a broad range of obsessive compulsive symptoms, 
including a subscale consisting of contamination-related obsessions and associated washing and 
cleaning compulsions.  The contamination subscale was used to assess severity of contamination 







Participant Characteristics by Condition in Experiment 2 
  Condition   
 Total 
(N = 124) 
Control 
(n = 31) 
Low  
(n = 30) 
Moderate 
(n = 33) 
High 





















































Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; VOCI-CTN = Contamination Subscale of the 





















much each statement is true of them.  Internal consistency for the contamination subscale in the 
current sample was α = .91.  
Treatment Acceptability and Adherence Scale (TAAS; Milosevic, Levy, Alcolado, & 
Radomsky, in press).  The TAAS is a 10-item questionnaire that assesses perceived acceptability 
of treatment (e.g., “It would be distressing to me to participate in this treatment”, “If I began this 
treatment, I would be able to complete it”).  Statements are rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).  This scale was used to assess the perceived 
acceptability of the exposure component of the study.  The internal consistency in the current 
study was α = .88. 
Self-Efficacy Questionnaire for Phobic Situations (SEQ; Flatt & King, 2009).  The SEQ 
is a 13-item questionnaire that aims to assess aspects of perceived self-efficacy.  Individuals use 
a 5-point Likert scale to indicate their perceived ability to cope with situations related to their 
feared stimulus.  In the current study, participants were asked to consider “feared contaminants, 
contamination-related situations, and fear of becoming ill” when completing the questionnaire.  
This scale was created and validated on a child and adolescent sample; however, the items reflect 
the construct of self-efficacy and are written in language appropriate for adults.  This scale was 
used to assess perceived self-efficacy before and after an exposure session, and at one-week 
follow-up.  Internal consistency in the current sample was α = .70. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI-II is a 
21-item questionnaire that aims to assess depressive symptoms occurring over the previous two 
weeks.  Participants use a 4-point scale to indicate how frequently they have experienced each 
symptom.  The internal consistency for the current sample was α = .93. 
Behavioural Approach Test (BAT).  The BAT is a frequently used behavioural measure 
of fear that assesses willingness to approach a feared stimulus.  In the current study, participants 
were asked to approach a “dirty” toilet, and their ability to approach and interact with the toilet 
was coded on a multi-step hierarchy (see Appendix A).  
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958).  The SUDS was used to assess 
distress level at multiple time points during the study (e.g., during BATs, during an exposure 
session).  Ratings are made on a 0 to 100 scale, with 0 being no anxiety whatsoever, and 100 
being the worst anxiety imaginable.  





Cognitive load.  Participants in distraction conditions were asked to use a 10-point Likert 
scale (0 = not at all to 9 = completely) to rate the extent to which they agreed with each of three 
statements.  Items were created for the purpose of the current study, and assessed how difficult 
the verbal task was perceived to be, and how much mental effort it took to complete the verbal 
task.  The internal consistency for these items was α = .61.  Participants in the control condition 
were asked to respond to similar statements that were worded to be relevant to their experience 
(i.e., how difficult it was to remain quiet). 
Visual attention.  These two items aimed to assess how often participants visually 
attended to the toilet, and asked what percent of the time their visual focus was on the toilet (later 
converted from a 0 to 100 scale to the 0 to 9 scale detailed above) and how often they visually 
attended to something other than the toilet (reverse-scored). The internal consistency for these 
items was α = .65. 
Other distraction strategies used.  Participants were also asked to respond to a single 
question (using the 0 to 9 scale described above) to indicate how often they utilized distraction 
techniques during the exposure that they were not specifically asked to use. 
Previous psychological and psychopharmacological treatment.  Participants responded 
to questions about whether they had ever taken medication or received psychotherapy for 
psychological problems.  If they had received psychotherapy, they were asked to specify what 
problems were addressed and to respond to a number of specific questions about the 
psychotherapy.  These questions were based on the OCD Treatment History Questionnaire 
(Stobie, Taylor, Quigley, Ewing, & Salkovskis, 2007), but were altered to be relevant to CBT 
more generally.  In the current study, to meet criteria for previous CBT, the treatment must have 
included: at least six sessions that lasted at least 40 minutes, some form of exposure, homework, 
a focus on a problem rather than childhood, an active (i.e., not silent) therapist, and a discussion 
of the links between behaviour, thoughts, and emotions. 
 Materials.  The “dirty toilet” used in this study as the fear stimulus was a plain white 
toilet that was made to appear dirty by spreading potting soil and melted chocolate inside the 
toilet bowl.  The toilet was situated in the corner of the room used for the BATs and exposure 
session, and was used as the stimulus for both of these tasks.  It is worth noting that many other 
studies investigating distraction during exposure have utilized the same stimulus for the exposure 





2004).  To measure behavioural approach, a hierarchy of steps was used that included first 
approaching and later touching different parts of the toilet (see Appendix A). 
Procedure.  Participants completed a screening measure either online or over the phone 
in order to assess their potential eligibility.  The screening measure included eight short vignettes 
related to situations or objects that individuals might fear (e.g., spiders, heights), one of which 
was a contaminated stimulus.  Each vignette was followed by a number of questions assessing 
related anxiety and behavioural avoidance.  In order to meet eligibility criteria, participants were 
required to (1) indicate responses exceeding specific predetermined values for the contamination 
vignette of the screening questionnaire (i.e., must have reported at least mild anxiety, mild 
unwillingness to approach, and moderate unwillingness to touch the contaminant), and (2) 
ultimately complete no more than 32 steps during their first BAT assessment (see below).  
Participants attended two visits separated by one week.  The first visit consisted of informed 
consent, completing baseline questionnaires assessing various symptoms of psychopathology, a 
pre-exposure BAT (at which time final eligibility was confirmed), an exposure session, post-
exposure questionnaires regarding the exposure experience, a post-exposure BAT, and a final set 
of questionnaires.  The second visit consisted of questionnaires upon arrival, a follow-up BAT, 
and completion of a final battery of questionnaires. 
Experimental conditions.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 
no, low, moderate, or high distraction.  The tasks used in the distraction conditions were 
determined in Experiment 1.  Specifically, the low distraction task included repeating words 
back to the experimenter, the moderate distraction task included a guided conversation, and the 
high distraction task was the same as the moderate task except participants were also asked to 
say “three” after every third word.  Instructions regarding the purpose of the exposure session 
and the exposure format were the same across conditions, including the request to maintain 
visual focus on the stimulus throughout the exposure.  No specific information about distraction 
or attention was provided in the rationale.  Condition-specific instructions about the distraction 
task (if relevant) were provided following randomization.   
Exposure session.  The exposure session was 20 minutes and self-paced (i.e., the 
participant decided if and when to proceed).  The exposure session typically began at the last 
step the participant had completed during the pre-exposure BAT, although all participants were 





be sufficiently long to allow for learning to occur, including the potential violation of 
expectations (e.g., Craske et al., 2014), depending on fear content.  Many other studies of 
distraction use in exposure have utilized exposure sessions of similar length, many of which have 
utilized exposure sessions 15 minutes or less in duration (e.g., Garcia-Palacios et al., 2007; Haw 
& Dickerson, 1998; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995).  Participants were 
asked to indicate their anxiety level every two minutes, and BAT distance was also recorded at 
these intervals.  Possible exposure steps paralleled the BAT steps, and participants were 
instructed to inform the experimenter if they wished to continue in order to be provided with the 
next step.  Additionally, if a participant reported a SUDS level of less than 40 they were 
provided with the next step, but were informed that they could choose whether or not they 
wished to move forward.   
BAT Assessments.  All BATs were conducted by a trained research assistant who was 
blind to condition assignment.  The BAT was discontinued when participants indicated that they 
no longer wanted to continue, at which point anxiety level was assessed.  If a SUDS rating of 30 
or below was provided, the research assistant asked if they would be willing to continue, but 
participants were also given a clear option of maintaining their decision to discontinue the task. 
Results 
 Baseline data screening.  No outliers were identified on any major outcome variables.  
Additionally, there were no baseline differences on any relevant questionnaires. 
 Previous treatment.  A total of 26 individuals (21%) reported having taken medication 
for psychological problems, and 42 individuals (34%) reported previous psychotherapy.  Of 
these 42 individuals, eight (7% of the overall sample) described receiving treatment that met 
criteria for previous CBT, four of which received this treatment for difficulties with anxiety.  
There were no differences between conditions in terms of previous treatment 
(psychopharmacological, general psychotherapy, or CBT; all χ2’s < 4.81, all p’s > .187). 
Manipulation checks.  A blind rater listened to 40-second segments of each audio-
recorded exposure session and predicted condition assignment.  When comparing predicted 
condition to actual condition assignment, all (100%) were correctly classified.  
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to investigate differences between conditions on 
variables assessing cognitive load and attention.  In terms of visual attention, there were no 





differences were only investigated between conditions using distraction tasks, as the items were 
not relevant to the no distraction condition.  There were significant differences between 
conditions, F(2, 90) = 29.30, p < .001, partial η² = .39, with follow-up analyses with a Bonferroni 
correction showing significantly greater cognitive load in the high condition compared to the low 
and moderate conditions (p’s < .001), and a trend towards greater cognitive load in the moderate 
condition compared to the low condition (p = .056).  Finally, the use of other distraction 
techniques was significantly different between conditions, F(3, 123) = 7.88, p < .001, partial η² = 
.17.  Specifically, the control condition had significantly higher scores than both the moderate 
and high conditions, and the low condition had significantly higher scores than the high 
condition. 
Changes in behavioural approach.  Mixed 2 (time) by 4 (condition) ANOVAs were 
conducted to assess change in number of BAT steps completed from pre- to post-exposure and 
from post-exposure to one-week follow-up (see Figure 3); these analyses were conducted 
separately given that the rate of change for each time frame was expected to differ.  For pre- to 
post-exposure there was a main effect of time, F(1, 120) = 125.27, p < .001, partial η² = .51, with 
an increase in BAT steps completed regardless of condition.  However, there was no time by 
condition interaction, F(3, 120) = 1.89, p = .134, partial η² = .05.  Although the interaction was 
not significant, it is worth noting that when considering individual effect sizes for change in BAT 
steps by condition, the effect size for the high distraction condition (d = 0.80) was much lower 
than the effect sizes for the control, low, and moderate conditions (d = 1.45, 1.27, and 1.37, 
respectively).  For changes in behavioural approach from post-exposure to one-week follow-up 
there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 117) = 20.01, p < .001, partial η² = .15, 
indicating that all conditions continued to improve; however, there was not a significant time by 
condition interaction, F(3, 117) = 0.22, p = .882, partial η² = .01.  In this case, the effect size for 
change by condition was slightly smaller in the moderate condition (d = 0.21) compared to the 
control, low, and high conditions (d = 0.52, 0.52, and 0.61, respectively). 
Self-report symptom measures.  A mixed 2 (time) by 4 (condition) ANOVA was 
conducted in order to assess for changes in self-reported contamination fear using the VOCI-
CTN.  The two time points were pre-exposure (i.e., baseline) and one-week follow-up.  For 







Figure 3. Behavioural approach by condition and time in Experiment 2; BAT = Behavioural 















































partial η² = .03, with scores reducing over the course of the study regardless of condition, but 
there was no significant time by condition interaction, F(3, 120) = 1.06, p = .369, partial η² = .03.   
 Changes in self-efficacy.  Changes in self-efficacy (i.e., SEQ scores) were evaluated pre- 
to post-exposure and post-exposure to one-week follow-up using mixed 2 (time) by 4 (condition) 
ANOVAs.  For pre- to post-exposure, there was a main effect of time, F(1, 120) = 43.11, p < 
.001, partial η² = .26, with all conditions showing an increase in self-efficacy over time.  
Additionally, there was a significant time by condition interaction, F(3, 120) = 3.40, p = .020, 
partial η² = .08, with individuals in the moderate condition showing a greater increase in self-
efficacy scores (see Figure 4).  Simple effects analyses showed a significant increase in self-
efficacy in all conditions except the low condition, and the largest pre- to post-exposure effect 
size was in the moderate condition (d = 0.98).  The control and high conditions had comparable 
effect sizes (d = 0.52 and 0.58, respectively), and the low condition had the smallest effect size 
(d = 0.28).  When considering post-exposure to one-week follow-up, there was no main effect of 
time, F(1, 117) = 0.07, p = .793, partial η² = .003, and no significant interaction, F(3, 117) = 
0.65, p = .582, partial η² = .02. 
Treatment acceptability.  To investigate differences in treatment acceptability, a one-
way between-participants ANOVA was conducted using TAAS scores as the outcome variable.  
There was a significant difference between conditions, F(3, 123) = 7.23, p < .001, partial η² = .15 
(see Figure 5).  Post-hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction showed that the moderate 
condition rated treatment acceptability significantly higher than the control (p = .013) and low (p 
< .001) conditions.  Additionally, the high distraction condition showed significantly higher 
acceptability ratings than the low distraction condition (p = .013).  
Discussion 
 This study investigated the impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome 
in a contamination-fearful sample, and the impact of distraction use on treatment acceptability 
and changes in self-efficacy.  The three distraction conditions (low, moderate, and high 
distraction) were previously established as having differing levels of cognitive load (see 
Experiment 1).  Contrary to our hypothesis, there were no significant differences between 
conditions (no, low, moderate, or high distraction) in change in behavioural approach following 
an exposure session or at one-week follow-up; however, effect sizes indicated less improvement 






Figure 4. Self-efficacy scores by condition and time in Experiment 2; SEQ = Self-Efficacy 









































Figure 5. Treatment acceptability scores by condition in Experiment 2; TAAS = Treatment 






































self-efficacy following exposure were greatest in the moderate distraction condition, and 
treatment acceptability ratings were greatest in conditions utilizing moderate or high levels of 
distraction.  Overall, no statistically significant differences were observed in terms of exposure 
outcome (or changes in contamination fear symptomatology) based on condition, supporting the 
notion that distraction may not interfere with exposure.  Additionally, these results provide 
preliminary evidence that distraction use during exposure may increase treatment acceptability 
and aid in increasing self-efficacy. 
There are some potential limitations that should be considered when interpreting the 
current results.  For example, although the exposure session was structured to be self-paced to 
increase ecological validity, this likely increased the probability that participants approached the 
tasks differently.  All participants were asked to inform the experimenter if they were ready to 
proceed; however, participants in the control condition were far more likely to request the next 
step (as assessed by a blind coder who listened to the audio-recorded exposure sessions), likely 
due to the fact that they were not completing a concurrent task.  This may have related to 
boredom, or alternatively, it is possible that individuals in distraction conditions did not make 
such requests as often as they would have if they had not been completing a concurrent task, 
thereby altering the progression of exposure.  Additionally, due to variable starting points and no 
requirement to move forward when anxiety was at a certain level, the exposure experience 
differed across participants.  For example, while some refused to move forward when their 
anxiety was very low, others with very high anxiety continued to request and complete additional 
steps.  Again, design decisions were made with the intention of maintaining ecological validity, 
yet this inherently reduced controllability of each individual’s experience.  It is therefore possible 
that a different design investigating a similar research question may produce different results.   
There are a number of other limitations to consider.  First, although participants were 
screened for high levels of fear, they were not assessed for clinical severity, nor were they 
treatment-seeking.  Therefore, generalizability to a clinical treatment-seeking sample is unclear.  
Additionally, only one specific type of anxiety was investigated, namely contamination fear.  It 
is possible that habituation of fear occurs at different rates for various types of anxiety, and that 
differences may have emerged with another type of fear, such as a specific phobia.  However, we 
chose to examine contamination fear because many of the studies in this area have been 





complex) fears.  Additionally, specific instructions regarding distraction use (or lack thereof) 
were not provided to the control condition in order to allow this condition to represent exposure 
as usual; unfortunately individuals in this condition therefore often utilized distraction techniques 
without being specifically instructed to do so.  Given that individuals in the control condition 
often utilized their own distraction techniques (M = 4.97, SD = 2.81; 0 to 9 scale assessing 
frequency of use), comparisons with the instructed distraction conditions are essentially less 
strong.  However, the vast majority of studies on distraction using an exposure do not provide 
instructions regarding attentional focus in exposure-only conditions (e.g., Kamphuis & Telch, 
2000; Oliver & Page, 2008; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Telch et al., 2004).  It is also worth 
noting that the internal consistencies of self-reported cognitive load and visual attention in 
Experiment 2 were low (α = .61 and .65, respectively).  Finally, the same stimulus was utilized 
for the BAT assessments and the exposure session, which has been done in other distraction 
studies (e.g., Mohlman & Zinbarg, 2000; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Telch et al., 2004) but 
nonetheless limits our ability to observe general changes in contamination fear.  Notwithstanding 
the above limitations, the results remain promising and informative. 
 Given our findings, the level of distraction used in treatment may simply not be important 
to exposure outcome.  Discrepant findings in the extant distraction literature shaped our 
hypothesis due to the wide range of distraction tasks employed.  However, it is possible that 
other factors may be more important to whether or not distraction is helpful or harmful during 
exposure.  Specifically, it is possible that distraction task properties (e.g., interest in the task, 
personal relevance, etc.) or individual differences (e.g., personality, coping style, etc.) may help 
explain previous mixed findings.  Similarly, beliefs about distraction may play an important role 
in the degree to which distraction aids or detracts from exposure efficacy (Senn & Radomsky, in 
press).  Additionally, it may be important to consider cognitive versus visual distraction.  In the 
current study, cognitive attention was manipulated while visual attention was maintained across 
conditions (supported by self-reported ratings of cognitive and visual attention).  In many other 
distraction studies reporting favourable outcomes related to distraction use, visual attention was 
maintained (e.g., Craske, Street, Jayaraman, & Barlow, 1991; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & 
Page, 2003, 2008).  Furthermore, in many studies with negative effects of distraction, visual 
attention was not maintained in the distraction condition (e.g., Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1982; 





requested to visually focus on the distractor (e.g., Rodriguez & Craske, 1995).  It is therefore 
possible that the level of cognitive load of a distraction task is less important than visual attention 
to the feared stimulus, or that these two factors may interact.  One study conducted by Mohlman 
and Zinbarg (2000) attempted to assess the importance of both visual and cognitive attention 
through manipulating both factors.  They found that presence of both types of attention was 
related to lower fear ratings during a post-exposure BAT; however, further research may be 
necessary to further elucidate the impact of these factors.  Overall, it is important to continue 
clarifying the role of various forms of distraction (or individual differences) to aid in our 
understanding of the existing distraction literature, and to obtain clinically-relevant information 
regarding how (and for whom) distraction should or should not be utilized during treatment. 
In the current study, regardless of distraction level there were no significant differences 
between conditions for changes in behavioural approach or symptoms of contamination fear.  
Therefore, although level of distraction did not lead to the hypothesized differences between 
conditions, there was evidence that distraction may not interfere with exposure outcome 
(although effect size analyses indicate somewhat less improvement in the high distraction 
condition).  It is additionally worth noting that although differences between conditions were not 
significant, it appears that the control and moderate distraction conditions fared somewhat better 
overall.  Furthermore, while increased self-efficacy was observed across conditions, and all 
participants completed a similar exposure exercise with comparable improvement, individuals in 
the moderate distraction condition experienced greater increases pre- to post-exposure than any 
other condition.  These results further parallel those observed by Johnstone and Page (2004), in 
which individuals undergoing distracted exposure showed greater increase in self-efficacy pre- to 
post-exposure than individuals completing focused exposure.  Together these findings provide 
support for the theory that self-efficacy is related to an increased sense of mastery or 
accomplishment, which may have been impacted by decreased arousal (and therefore greater 
perceived coping ability) in the moderate distraction condition (Bandura, 1977; 1988).  However, 
future studies should consider assessing whether decreased arousal and increased coping ability 
are in fact mechanisms that impact greater increases in self-efficacy when distraction is utilized, 
as this was not directly assessed in the current study. 
 The current results also provide important insight into the potential acceptability-





use on perceived treatment acceptability has not been investigated.  Given that treatment refusal 
and drop-out rates remain high (e.g., Bados, Balaguer, & Saldaña, 2007; Foa et al., 2005), along 
with the possibility that individuals may be making these decisions based on concerns about the 
anxiety-provoking nature of exposure (e.g., Veale, 1999), this research area requires further 
attention.  Similar treatment acceptability research has been conducted in the area of safety 
behaviour, but has typically investigated the use of overt safety aids (e.g., wearing gloves or 
protective gear) rather than looking at distraction, a more covert form of safety behaviour.  In the 
safety behaviour literature, treatment vignettes incorporating the use of safety aids have been 
rated as more acceptable than those that discourage the use of safety behaviour (Levy, Senn, & 
Radomsky, 2014; Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013a), and the same pattern was observed in an 
experimental study with an unselected student sample (Levy & Radomsky, 2014).  Of note, 
experimental studies have also been conducted to assess the impact of safety behaviour use on 
exposure outcome, many of which have found that safety behaviour use does not necessarily 
impact outcome negatively (e.g., Hood, Antony, Koerner, & Monson, 2010; Milosevic & 
Radomsky, 2013b).  The results of the current study parallel the treatment acceptability findings 
detailed above in that individuals who used a substantial amount of distraction during exposure 
(i.e., at least a moderate level) rated the treatment component they completed (e.g., the exposure 
session) as more acceptable than individuals who were not instructed to use distraction or who 
used very minimal distraction.  Importantly, it has been suggested that the use of distraction 
techniques or safety behaviour during the initial stages of treatment may aid in increased 
treatment engagement (e.g., Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; Rachman, Radomsky, & 
Shafran, 2008).  .   
It is worth noting that one participant in the control condition dropped out of the study 
during the exposure because they were too anxious to continue.  When this participant was 
debriefed about the purpose of the study, they said “I could have done it if I had been distracted”.  
Others in the control condition often stated they wished they had been in a distraction condition, 
or similarly, that they would have completed more steps if they had been distracted.  Individuals 
in the moderate and high distraction conditions often provided unsolicited comments stating how 
helpful the distraction was, including comments such as “the conversation made me feel relaxed 
and made me feel like I could do it – now I can continue to confront my fears because I know it 





have led to individuals feeling distanced from the exposure (e.g., “that really worked, I totally 
forgot my hand was even on the toilet”).  These comments as a whole support the notion that 
participants found the treatment more acceptable when distracted, and that many individuals in 
the control condition were disappointed that they were not provided with a distraction task. 
 While distraction may aid in increasing treatment acceptability, it remains important to 
discern whether there are certain circumstances under which distraction should or should not be 
used.  These circumstances may theoretically relate to either the type of distraction used or to 
individual differences between clients.  In other words, it is possible that for certain individuals 
the use of distraction during the initial stages of treatment to help increase acceptability and self-
efficacy may be useful and even encouraged, whereas for other individuals this may be 
discouraged.  Additionally, certain types of distraction may be more useful than others.  The 
current study utilized verbal tasks because we thought the task used in the condition we 
hypothesized would perform best (i.e., moderate distraction) could easily be implemented in 
clinical practice, and also because it paralleled tasks used in previous studies with positive 
outcomes for distraction use (e.g., Oliver & Page, 2003); however, other types of distraction may 
lead to different results.  Additionally, it may be useful to understand whether the role of 
distraction differs when it is used during encoding, extinction, or during post-event processing.  
In summary, more research will aid in further elucidating when, how, and for whom distraction 
may be useful.  However, given that the use of distraction during exposure may not necessarily 
be harmful and that its use may increase perceived acceptability of treatment, its potential utility 
















Impact of Beliefs about Distraction on Exposure Outcome 
 The purpose of this chapter is to briefly address the intersection between the development 
of the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI; see Chapter 2) and the experimental study 
investigating the use of distraction during exposure (see Chapter 4).  Due to the fact that this 
document is a manuscript-based thesis, these analyses were not able to be included in the second 
manuscript due to journal-related space restrictions.  However, the following investigation and 
associated results will be incorporated into a separate manuscript to be submitted for publication 
in the future. 
Background Information 
 The BADI was developed in order to provide a psychometrically-sound measure of 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction, and to allow for the use of such a measure in future studies 
including those evaluating distraction use during exposure.  The beliefs an individual holds about 
the function distraction serves when confronted with anxiety-provoking situations may be 
important to consider in the context of exposure (both with and without distraction).  It has been 
suggested that the coping strategies an individual tends to utilize when anxious may be more 
important to exposure outcome than whether or not distraction is used (Rodriguez & Craske, 
1993), which may indicate that the use or reliance upon specific strategies may be an important 
area of investigation.  Furthermore, it has been proposed that whether or not an action can be 
classified as adaptive coping or maladaptive avoidance may relate to the function of the action 
for the individual, or in other words the beliefs an individual holds about the utility of using such 
strategies (e.g., Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  In the context of 
treatment, it is possible that if an individual holds strong maladaptive beliefs about distraction 
(i.e., that distraction is essential to cope with anxiety), this may interfere with treatment, and it 
may therefore be ideal to discourage the use of distraction for this individual.  On the other hand, 
if an individual does not typically rely on distraction, it may not be detrimental for this individual 
to use distraction during exposure.  In other words, it is possible that beliefs about distraction 
may be an important guide to determining whether to incorporate distraction during exposure. 
Importantly, these beliefs may in fact better predict improvement following distracted exposure 





lead to quite different treatment recommendations that thus far have not been sufficiently 
considered or addressed. 
 Through the development and validation of the BADI a two-factor structure was 
established, with one factor reflecting that “distraction is necessary” (BADI-N) and one 
reflecting that “distraction is effective” (BADI-E).  Importantly, in both the exploratory factor 
analysis sample and a subclinical confirmatory factor analysis sample, the BADI-N subscale 
showed stronger significant correlations with anxious symptomatology than the BADI-E 
subscale.  This may indicate that the belief that distraction is necessary, or reliance upon 
distraction to cope with anxiety, is more maladaptive and associated with psychopathology than 
simply the belief that distraction can be useful or effective, which may alternatively be 
associated with the use of distraction as more of an adaptive coping strategy.  However, it is 
important to experimentally assess the impact these beliefs have on exposure outcome, both in 
general and when distraction is utilized; this was the focus of the current preliminary 
investigation.  It was hypothesized that maladaptive beliefs about distraction would predict less 
improvement following exposure when distraction (at either moderate or high levels) was 
utilized.  Due to the greater associations of BADI-N scores with psychopathology, it was also 
predicted that these subscale scores would be more strongly related to worse exposure outcome 
than BADI-E scores.  Overall, maladaptive beliefs about distraction were hypothesized to 
negatively impact an individual’s ability to improve over the course of an exposure session when 
at least moderate levels of distraction were employed.  
Method   
Participants.  Contamination-fearful participants were recruited as part of a larger study 
(see Chapter 4, Experiment 2).  A total of 124 individuals were eligible to complete the 
aforementioned study and were therefore included in the current analyses.  The mean age of the 
sample was 24.85 (SD = 8.29) years, 92% was female, and 52% self-identified as Caucasian.   
Measures 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI; Senn & Radomsky, in press).  The BADI is 
a 24-item scale that measures the beliefs an individual holds about distraction.  The BADI 
consists of two subscales: Distraction is Necessary (BADI-N) and Distraction is Effective 
(BADI-E).  Individuals respond using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree very much and 7 





Behavioural Approach Test (BAT).  The BAT was used as behavioural measure of fear, 
and involved approaching a “dirty” toilet.  For details, please see Chapter 4 (Experiment 2). 
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958).  The SUDS was used to assess 
self-reported anxiety at the highest BAT step completed, both pre- and post-exposure.  
Participants were asked to provide a number from 0 (“no anxiety whatsoever”) to 100 (“the worst 
anxiety imaginable”) to indicate their current level of distress. 
 Procedure.  The aforementioned hypothesis was tested using the same experimental 
paradigm and design detailed in the exposure-based experiment of this research program, namely 
Experiment 2 of Chapter 4 (see above).  Briefly, contamination-fearful participants (i.e., a 
subclinical sample) completed a brief exposure session with either no, low, moderate, or high 
distraction.  Behavioural approach was measured via a BAT before and after the exposure 
session, and SUDS ratings were obtained at the highest step reached during each BAT.  The 
BADI was administered at baseline, prior to the experimental manipulation. 
Results 
 To test the hypothesis that maladaptive beliefs about distraction (i.e., higher scores on the 
BADI) would be related to less improvement following exposure in conditions utilizing 
distraction, hierarchical linear regressions were conducted for each condition.  The outcome 
variable was the number of BAT steps completed post-exposure, and the predictor variables were 
BAT steps completed pre-exposure (Step 1), and BADI-N and BADI-E subscale scores (together 
in Step 2).  Pre-exposure BAT steps were entered as a predictor to account for initial fear level 
(i.e., behavioural approach).  The addition of BADI scores in Step 2 did not account for 
additional variance in the control, low, or high distraction conditions (see Tables 6, 7, and 8, 
respectively).  The only condition for which BADI scores accounted for significant added 
variance in the model was the moderate distraction condition (see Table 9), suggesting that a 
negative impact of maladaptive beliefs about distraction was only present when moderate levels 
of distraction were utilized.  Importantly, the association was negative in that higher BADI 
scores related to fewer post-exposure BAT steps completed, after controlling for pre-exposure 
BAT steps. 
 It was predicted that high scores on the BADI-N subscale may be more detrimental to 
treatment outcome (due to the association with psychopathology) than high scores on the BADI-






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure BAT Steps in the 
Control Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure BAT 1.44 0.25 .73*** 1.29 0.29 .66*** 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    -0.12 0.14 -.20 
     BADI-E    0.05 0.39 .03 
       
R
2
  .53   .56  
∆R2  .53   .03  
F-change  33.00***   0.88  
Note. BAT = Behavioural Approach Test; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 





















Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure BAT Steps in the Low 
Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure BAT 1.38 0.20 .80*** 1.38 0.20 .80*** 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    0.01 0.09 .02 
     BADI-E    -0.23 0.25 -.13 
       
R
2
  .64   .66  
∆R2  .64   .02  
F-change  49.81***   0.55  
Note. BAT = Behavioural Approach Test; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 












Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure BAT Steps in the High 
Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure BAT 0.89 0.25 .56** 0.73 0.28 .46* 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    -0.09 0.09 -.23 
     BADI-E    -0.01 0.28 -.01 
       
R
2
  .31   .36  
∆R2  .31   .05  
F-change  12.56**   0.91  
Note. BAT = Behavioural Approach Test; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 





























Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure BAT Steps in the 
Moderate Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure BAT 1.10 0.25 .63*** 0.91 0.22 .52*** 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    -0.07 0.08 -.15 
     BADI-E    -0.63 0.32 -.34
†
 
       
R
2
  .39   .58  
∆R2  .39   .19  
F-change  20.05***   6.68**  
Note. BAT = Behavioural Approach Test; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 
about Distraction Inventory; 
†
p < .10; **p < .01;
 



















step in the above regressions in order to understand the contribution of each of these subscales.  
In the control, low, and high distraction conditions the contribution of the subscales did not differ 
significantly (see Tables 6, 7, and 8, respectively).  However, in the moderate distraction 
condition, the BADI-E subscale showed a trend towards significance while the BADI-N subscale 
did not (see Table 9).  Therefore, the BADI-E subscale may be more important to the association 
between BADI scores and exposure outcome than BADI-N scores.  
 Finally, the impact of BADI scores on change in anxiety (at the highest BAT step 
reached; SUDS) from pre- to post-exposure was examined.  Hierarchical linear regressions 
similar to those detailed above were conducted, with post-exposure SUDS as the outcome 
variable, pre-exposure SUDS as Step 1, and BADI-N and BADI-E scores together as Step 2.  
The addition of BADI scores to the model accounted for additional variance in post-exposure 
SUDS in the control and low conditions such that higher BADI scores were related to higher 
anxiety (see Tables 10 and 11, respectively).  This relationship was not observed in the moderate 
or high conditions (see Tables 12 and 13, respectively).  Interestingly, for both the control and 
low distraction conditions, the contribution from the BADI-E subscale was stronger than that of 
the BADI-N subscale (see Tables 10 and 11). 
Discussion 
 The aim of this investigation was to understand the role maladaptive beliefs about 
distraction may play in exposure outcome.  Overall it appeared that stronger maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction were associated with less improvement over the course of an exposure session 
when a moderate level of distraction was utilized.  It was hypothesized that maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction would impact outcome with moderate or high levels of distraction.  It is 
puzzling that the observed relationship was only present with a moderate level of distraction 
rather than with any distraction use; however, given that effect sizes showed less improvement in 
the high distraction condition (See Chapter 4), it is possible that this relationship may not have 
been observable due to less improvement in general (i.e., less variance).  It is also possible that 
the type and level of distraction that was employed in the moderate condition (i.e., a 
conversation) was more similar to the typical distraction strategies an individual might use, and 
thus more relevant to their beliefs.  Therefore, in the moderate condition, individuals who held 







Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure SUDS in the Control 
Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure 
SUDS 
0.78 0.17 .65*** 0.60 0.18 .50** 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    -0.07 0.28 -.05 
     BADI-E    1.65 0.80 .43* 
       
R
2
  .42   .55  
∆R2  .42   .13  
F-change  20.90***   3.83*  
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of 
the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 




















Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure SUDS in the Low 
Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure 
SUDS 
0.62 0.17 .56** 0.51 0.17 .46** 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    0.07 0.25 .05 
     BADI-E    1.46 0.74 .36† 
       
R
2
  .31   .45  
∆R2  .31   .14  
F-change  12.63**   3.29†  
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of 
the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 












Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure SUDS in the Moderate 
Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure SUDS 0.46 0.19 .40* 0.40 0.24 .34 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    -0.23 0.32 -.17 
     BADI-E    1.17 1.37 .22 
       
R
2
  .16   .18  
∆R2  .16   .02  
F-change  5.75*   0.39  
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of 
the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 













Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of Post-Exposure SUDS in the High 
Distraction Condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
     Pre-Exposure SUDS 0.57 0.20 .47** 0.52 0.23 .43* 
Step 2       
     BADI-N    0.03 0.25 .03 
     BADI-E    0.29 0.79 .09 
       
R
2
  .22   .23  
∆R2  .22   .01  
F-change  8.04**   0.17  
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; BADI-N = Distraction is Necessary Subscale of 
the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory; BADI-E = Distraction is Effective Subscale of the Beliefs 




















were afforded the opportunity to use a strategy that they believe is helpful.  In this case, learning 
that distraction is not in fact necessary to cope with anxiety did not occur.  
Given that previous investigations indicated that the BADI-N subscale appears to be 
more associated with psychopathology than the BADI-E subscale, it was predicted that BADI-N 
scores would be more related to a negative impact of beliefs on outcome than BADI-E scores.  
Contrary to hypothesis, examination of the contributions of each of these subscales (BADI-N and 
BADI-E) to the significant result in the moderate distraction condition showed that the BADI-E 
subscale had a greater impact (at a trend level).  In other words, when moderate distraction was 
utilized, holding stronger beliefs that distraction is effective was related to less improvement.  
This result is surprising given the fact that BADI-N scores seem to be more related to 
psychopathology; however, it remains possible that beliefs that distraction is necessary and is 
effective may both negatively impact exposure progression.  It is also possible that while BADI-
N subscale scores are more associated with psychopathology in general, BADI-E subscale scores 
may be more related to treatment progression.  For example, if an individual believes that 
distraction is an effective anxiety reduction technique and is permitted to use distraction, they 
may be more likely to attribute the success of the exposure to the use of distraction than they 
would if they did not believe that distraction was effective.  Interestingly, misattribution of 
success to another action (rather than the exposure itself) has been theorized by some to lead to 
less overall improvement in treatment (e.g., Salkovskis, 1991). 
When investigating the impact of BADI scores on changes in anxiety pre- to post-
exposure, BADI scores were significantly related to anxiety in the control and low distraction 
conditions.  Specifically, in both the control and low conditions having higher BADI scores 
related to greater post-exposure anxiety levels, and this relationship was stronger for BADI-E 
scores than BADI-N scores.  In other words, individuals who believe that distraction is effective 
but were not provided with a distraction task (or were provided with a minimally distracting 
task) reported higher anxiety levels following exposure.  When individuals believe that 
distraction works and are not allowed to sufficiently distract themselves, they may remain more 
anxious because they are unable to use a strategy that they consider to be useful.  However, more 
research needs to be conducted in order to better understand this relationship. 
It is worth noting that design-related issues may have impacted the current results (see 





this study was comprised of all 43 items that were in the unaltered version of the BADI, but only 
the items retained following factor analysis were included in the analyses for the current study.  
Therefore, it is important to assess the psychometric properties and impact of BADI scores when 
the final version of the measure is administered.  However, these results provide important 
insight into the possibility that maladaptive beliefs about distraction may in fact impact treatment 
under certain conditions.   
It is important to continue evaluating the impact of beliefs about distraction on treatment, 
especially with a clinical or treatment-seeking sample.  The results of the current study suggest 
that when moderate levels of distraction are utilized, individuals with greater maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction may not improve as much following exposure.  It would be useful to see if this 
is true for all forms of distraction as well as whether the distraction strategy that is used is one 
that the individual uses on a regular basis.  Specifically, it is possible that allowing the use of an 
individual’s typical distraction strategies may be more problematic than allowing the use of a 
novel distraction task.  Indeed, a recent study on the use of typically-used versus novel safety 
aids in exposure for contamination fear showed greater improvement when novel safety aids 
were utilized (Levy & Radomsky, under review).  Future studies may also be helpful in 
understanding the differing contributions of the BADI-N and BADI-E subscales both in terms of 




















 The purpose of this research program was to investigate potential factors that may impact 
whether the use of distraction during exposure helps or hinders treatment outcome and 
acceptability.  The impetus for this research was the discrepant findings in the literature 
investigating the use of distraction during exposure, and the difficulty evaluating these results 
due to vast differences in experimental protocols and distraction tasks across studies (Podină et 
al., 2013; Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  The goal was to clarify the role of distraction by aiming 
to understand under what conditions and for whom distraction may be useful versus harmful.  
Accordingly, several studies were conducted in order to evaluate two different and potentially 
relevant factors.  The first study aimed to develop a psychometrically-sound measure of 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction, as individual differences in reliance upon distraction may 
be an important construct to evaluate.  This study included an exploratory factor analysis with an 
unselected student sample, as well as a confirmatory factor analysis with a contamination-fearful 
sample.  The second study was comprised of two experiments that together aimed to establish the 
impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome.  The first experiment assessed the 
level of cognitive load associated with different distraction tasks, and the second experiment 
incorporated the selected distraction tasks during an exposure session to assess the impact of 
level of distraction on both outcome and treatment acceptability.  Given the suggestion that high 
levels of distraction may be detrimental to exposure outcome (e.g., Telch et al., 2004), 
experimentally evaluating the impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome has 
the potential to aid in further  understanding the relevance of this factor to exposure outcome. 
Summary of Findings 
 Study 1.  In this study a large unselected undergraduate student sample completed the 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI) and measures assessing similar constructs and 
general psychopathology.  In order to further evaluate the psychometric properties of the BADI 
in an anxious population, the BADI and a similar battery of questionnaires were also 
administered to a contamination-fearful sample.  An exploratory factor analysis with the 
unselected student sample revealed a two-factor solution including the Distraction is Necessary 
subscale (BADI-N) and the Distraction is Effective subscale (BADI-E).  The BADI and its 





measures of general anxious and depressive symptomatology, highlighting the relevance of this 
construct to psychopathology.  Internal consistency was excellent, and retest reliability analyses 
indicated that scores remained stable over a four week period.   
A confirmatory factor analysis conducted with the contamination-fearful sample showed 
adequate model fit, and similar convergent and divergent validity and associations with 
psychopathology as those observed in the unselected student sample.  Notably, in the unselected 
student sample the BADI-N factor was more strongly associated with psychopathology than the 
BADI-E factor, and in the contamination-fearful sample only the BADI-N (not the BADI-E) 
factor was associated with psychopathology.  The findings of this study indicate that the BADI is 
a reliable and valid measure of maladaptive beliefs about distraction that is associated with 
psychopathology and can be utilized in future studies to better understand the potential impact of 
these beliefs on treatment outcome. 
 Study 2.  This study was comprised of two separate experiments that together aimed to 
evaluate the impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure outcome.  In Experiment 1, the 
cognitive load associated with a number of verbal distraction tasks was evaluated by assessing 
increases in reaction time (on a simple reaction time task) that resulted from concurrently 
completing one of five tasks.  The amount of cognitive load associated with the verbal tasks 
followed the hypothesized direction, and tasks with low, moderate, and high levels of cognitive 
load were identified.  These three tasks were selected because they differed significantly from 
one another in terms of changes in reaction time, and thus were established as having 
significantly different levels of cognitive load.  Importantly, self-reported cognitive load 
associated with the verbal task was significantly correlated with objective cognitive load (i.e., 
changes in reaction time when completing the concurrent task), indicating that individuals are 
relatively accurate at assessing the level of difficulty associated with task completion.  
 Experiment 2 utilized the varied levels of distraction tasks identified in Experiment 1 to 
assess the impact of these differing levels of distraction on the outcome of an exposure session.  
Specifically, contamination-fearful individuals completed a single exposure session with either 
no, low, moderate, or high distraction.  Behavioural approach was assessed pre-exposure, post-
exposure, and at one-week follow-up.  No significant differences were observed in changes in 
behavioural approach based on condition, although the effect size for change was much smaller 





contamination fear were also assessed, and although improvement was observed, the 
improvement was equivalent across conditions.  These results are consistent with previous 
research showing that exposure outcome is similar whether or not distraction is employed (e.g., 
Antony et al., 2001).   
In addition to investigating differences in exposure outcome, this experiment also aimed 
to evaluate whether the use of distraction would relate to increased treatment acceptability, and 
whether changes in self-efficacy over the course of exposure would be enhanced by the use of 
distraction.  Results indicated that treatment acceptability was highest in conditions utilizing 
moderate and high levels of distraction.  Furthermore, increases in self-efficacy, although evident 
in all conditions, were significantly greater in the moderate distraction condition compared to all 
other conditions.  These results suggest that distraction may not interfere with exposure outcome 
at any level (although high levels of distraction may not be optimal), and that the use of 
distraction techniques may in fact increase perceived treatment acceptability and willingness to 
engage in exposure. 
 Supplemental Study.  In order to assess the impact maladaptive beliefs about distraction 
may have on exposure outcome (either distracted or undistracted), participants in Experiment 2 
of Study 2 also completed the BADI.  The results of this investigation were presented in a brief 
supplemental chapter (Chapter 5).  Overall, when a moderate level of distraction was utilized, 
greater maladaptive beliefs about distraction were associated with less improvement over the 
course of an exposure session.  It is therefore possible that maladaptive beliefs about distraction 
have a negative impact on exposure outcome only when a moderate (and potentially helpful) 
amount of distraction is utilized, or when such distraction is similar in nature to the typical 
distraction techniques an individual employs. 
Limitations and Strengths 
 It is of course important to consider the limitations of the current research program when 
interpreting the results.  For example, the exploratory factor analysis conducted for the BADI in 
Study 1 utilized data from an unselected student sample.  Given that individuals with nonclinical 
levels of anxiety may display different perceptions of distraction use, generalizability to a 
clinical sample is difficult.  This limitation was lessened somewhat by the use of a 
contamination-fearful sample for the confirmatory factor analysis; however, clinical status was 





of individuals with one specific type of anxiety (contamination fear), which does not readily 
allow for generalization across different forms of anxiety.  Therefore, future studies should 
confirm the factor structure of the BADI in a mixed clinically anxious sample. 
 In Study 2, the results of Experiment 1 (the validation of distraction tasks) may have been 
limited by the simplicity of the reaction time task and by the lack of a no distraction control 
condition to account for potential fatigue or practice effects.  However, given that the aim of the 
study was to establish differences between tasks, comparison to a control group was not central 
to the hypotheses.  In the exposure component of Study 2 (Experiment 2), the exposure session 
was designed with ecological validity in mind.  Although ecologically valid designs are 
associated with a number of benefits, the self-paced nature of the exposure session allowed 
varied approaches to be taken across participants, including significantly more self-directed 
advances in behavioural steps in the control condition.  Additionally, no instructions were 
provided to individuals in the control condition regarding refraining from distraction use.  While 
this is common practice in distraction studies (e.g., Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Oliver & Page, 
2008; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Telch et al., 2004), it allowed for the potential use of 
distraction techniques in a condition that was meant to be undistracted.  Indeed, individuals in 
this condition reported distracting themselves to a moderate degree.  It is also a limitation that, 
although screened for high levels of fear, the clinical status of participants was not assessed.  
Thus generalizability to a clinical and treatment-seeking sample is unclear, as is generalizability 
to types of anxiety other than contamination fear. 
 Finally, given that the BADI was still being validated and was administered in its original 
(rather than reduced) form to participants in Study 2, conclusions drawn about the impact of 
BADI scores on exposure outcome (see Chapter 5) should be interpreted with caution.  Future 
studies should utilize the revised version of the BADI in order to more accurately assess its 
relationship with exposure outcome.  Additionally, the same design concerns detailed above may 
have impacted the ability to observe differences across conditions with respect to the impact of 
maladaptive beliefs about distraction.  It is possible that a less complex design with fewer 
conditions (i.e., no distraction versus distraction) would present a more effective method by 
which to assess the impact of maladaptive beliefs about distraction on treatment outcome.  
 Although a number of limitations are evident in the present studies, this research program 





assess maladaptive beliefs about distraction to this author’s knowledge is the first of its kind, and 
may have important implications for clinical practice.  Specifically, the ability to measure these 
beliefs will allow for a clearer understanding of their relationship to treatment outcome, and 
therefore help determine whether these beliefs should be targeted directly in treatment.  Another 
notable strength of this research program was the experimental investigation of a factor that has 
been purported to impact the use of distraction during exposure (e.g., Rodriguez & Craske, 1993, 
1995; Telch et al., 2004) but has not yet been tested experimentally, namely the level of 
cognitive load involved in distraction tasks.  Furthermore, the distraction tasks were 
experimentally validated to establish significant differences in cognitive resources utilized, rather 
than simply assuming the presence of such differences.  This has been one limitation in attempts 
to evaluate this factor in the extant literature on distraction, as the level of cognitive load of 
different tasks cannot be retroactively assessed or compared across studies (Podină et al., 2013).   
Other strengths of this research program include the effort put forth to maintain 
ecological validity within the exposure session of Study 2, as well as the selection of distraction 
tasks that could realistically be utilized in clinical practice.  Additionally, the vast majority of 
prior studies conducted on distraction use during exposure have included participants with either 
subclinical or clinical levels of fear related to specific phobias, including spiders (Antony et al., 
2001; Craske, Street, Jayaraman, & Barlow, 1991; Haw & Dickerson, 1998; Johnstone & Page, 
2004; Mohlman & Zinbarg, 2000; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Rose & McGlynn, 1997), snakes 
(Craske, Street, Jayaraman, & Barlow, 1991; Rodriguez & Craske, 1995; Rose & McGlynn, 
1997), needles and/or blood (Oliver & Page, 2003, 2008; Penfold & Page, 1999), and enclosed 
spaces (Garcia-Palacios et al., 2007; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Telch et al., 2004; Wood & 
McGlynn, 2000).  The use of a contamination-fearful sample in the current study allowed for 
further understanding of the role of distraction in fears that may potentially be more complex 
than specific phobias.  Although a number of early studies of distraction were conducted with 
individuals with contamination-related OCD (e.g., Grayson, Foa, & Steketeee, 1982, 1986), 
revisiting the use of a contamination-fearful sample with a different protocol (e.g., involving 
visual focus on the feared stimulus) has been able to provide updated results on the use of 






 This body of work adds to our theoretical understanding of the role of distraction during 
exposure, including its impact on exposure outcome and treatment acceptability.  There has been 
longstanding debate in the literature regarding the use of distraction during exposure, with much 
disagreement regarding whether distraction helps or hinders treatment (Podină et al., 2013; 
Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  While numerous theories have suggested that distraction will 
negatively impact exposure (e.g., Craske et al., 2014; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rachman, 1980), the 
results of Study 2 provide support for theories that alternatively suggest that distraction may not 
interfere with treatment (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 1988; Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; 
Salkovskis, 1991).  Specifically, regardless of the level of distraction employed, participants 
using distraction and those not using distraction showed similar rates of improvement over the 
course of an exposure session, and at one-week follow-up (see Chapter 4).  Therefore, although 
full immersion with the exposure stimulus with the aim of emotional processing, focused 
cognitive attention on the stimulus, and learning new (non-fearful) associations have been 
proposed as necessary conditions for fear reduction (e.g., Barlow, 1988; Borkovec & Grayson, 
1980; Craske et al., 2014; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rachman, 1980; Watts, 1974), the hypothesized 
need for full immersion and attention was not supported by the current findings.  The results of 
the current study also parallel those of other studies which have not observed differences in 
exposure outcome when distraction is or is not utilized (e.g., Antony et al., 2001; Rose & 
McGlynn, 1997). 
It has been suggested that techniques that may be classified as adaptive coping, such as 
distraction, may not interfere with exposure because they do not directly aim to prevent feared 
catastrophic outcomes (e.g., Salkovskis, 1991; Salkovskis, Clark, & Gelder, 1996), and thus still 
allow for belief disconfirmation.  Although belief change was not directly assessed in this study, 
it is likely that some level of belief disconfirmation occurred across conditions, supporting the 
notion (and cognitive theory) that distraction may not interfere with this process.  Although the 
distinction between adaptive coping and maladaptive avoidance is often a difficult one (Thwaites 
& Freeston, 2005), a key consideration in making this distinction appears to be the function or 
intention behind the use of specific strategies (e.g., Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Thwaites & 
Freeston, 2005).  It may therefore be important to consider the intention behind the use of 
distraction.  In Study 1, a measure of maladaptive beliefs about distraction was created and 





that this distinction may hold both theoretical and clinical importance, being able to accurately 
assess this construct will allow future research to expand our understanding of the impact of such 
beliefs on treatment outcome.  A preliminary analysis of the impact of BADI scores on exposure 
outcome (see Chapter 5) indicated that individuals with higher maladaptive beliefs about 
distraction showed less improvement during an exposure session when they utilized a moderate 
level of distraction.  Therefore, it is possible that maladaptive beliefs about distraction may 
interact with the use of distraction in that individuals who hold these beliefs may show less 
improvement when these strategies are incorporated in treatment.  However, this hypothesis 
needs to be more directly examined, including with the use of the now-reduced BADI, in order to 
more clearly examine this relationship. 
While individual differences (including beliefs about distraction) may be an important 
aspect to consider when investigating the impact of distraction on exposure outcome, a number 
of additional factors may be relevant and warrant further investigation.  For example, among 
others, the type of distraction utilized (e.g., level of distraction intensity, affective valence, 
whether cognitive versus visual attention is involved), design considerations (e.g., length of 
exposure, outcome measures, instructions), and nature of the problem being investigated (e.g., 
type of anxiety disorder or analogue sample being used) may all be relevant factors.  In Study 2 
the issue of distraction intensity (or cognitive load) was investigated in order to better understand 
the impact of this factor.  Others have suggested the potential importance of distraction intensity 
(Podină et al., 2013; Rodriguez & Craske, 1993, 1995; Telch et al., 2004), but experimental 
investigations thus far have not compared multiple level of distraction.  However, research 
investigating the impact of cognitive load in the treatment of PTSD has been conducted, 
specifically related to understanding the mechanisms involved in EMDR. 
While initially puzzling, recent research on EMDR has suggested that the impact of eye 
movements on improved imaginal exposure outcome in PTSD relates to the cognitive load 
associated with this action (Engelhard et al., 2010; Engelhard et al., 2011; van den Hout & 
Engelhard, 2012; van den Hout et al., 2010).  Furthermore, the positive impact of cognitive load 
seems to be optimal when moderate levels are utilized rather than too little or too much cognitive 
load (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2010; van den Hout et al., 2001).  In the current investigation it was 
therefore predicted that moderate levels of distraction would have a positive impact on exposure 





largely unsupported in Study 2, with level of distraction (no, low, moderate, or high) not 
differentially impacting exposure outcome.  This was surprising given that others have found that 
high levels of distraction impede exposure outcome (e.g., Telch et al., 2004).  However, although 
between-condition comparisons did not reveal differences, within-condition effect sizes for 
change were lower in the high distraction condition than any other condition, indicating that 
individuals utilizing high levels of distraction may have exhibited less improvement.  This is 
consistent with existing theories; therefore, future examinations using different experimental 
protocols would aid in clarifying the impact of high levels of distraction on exposure outcome.  It 
was also surprising that moderate levels of distraction were not associated with greater 
improvement than a no distraction control; however, design limitations (see above) may be in 
part responsible for this finding.  Alternatively it is possible that distraction intensity is not a 
relevant factor when considering the implications of distraction use in exposure therapy.  
Importantly, even at various levels, the use of distraction in this study did not have a statistically 
negative impact on exposure outcome compared to a no distraction control, supporting previous 
research showing that distraction is not detrimental to treatment outcome (e.g., Antony et al., 
2001).  However, as mentioned above, more research needs to be conducted in order to 
understand the impact of high levels of distraction. 
Support for the notion that distraction does not lead to detrimental exposure outcome is 
also consistent with research investigating the use of safety behaviour during exposure.  Safety 
behaviour includes any action taken, either covert (e.g., distraction) or overt (e.g., the use of 
protective gear, carrying objects that provide a sense of safety), to protect oneself in an anxiety-
provoking situation (e.g., Salkovskis, 1991; Salkovskis, Clark, & Gelder, 1996).  Given that 
distraction is often considered a form of safety behaviour, an examination of the safety behaviour 
literature is informative.  It is worth noting, however, that the studies mentioned below utilized 
overt safety behaviour (e.g., gloves, other protective clothing, hygienic wipes, etc.).  These safety 
behaviours more directly aim to prevent feared catastrophe than distraction (e.g., Salkovskis, 
1991), and are therefore often viewed as more problematic; however, both overt and covert 
techniques aim to reduce distress to some degree, which explains why they are often pooled 
conceptually.  Importantly, recent research has suggested that the use of safety behaviour does 
not necessarily interfere with improvement following behavioural experiments or exposure (e.g., 





Rachman, Shafran, Radomsky, & Zysk, 2011; van den Hout, Engelhard, Toffolo, & van Uijen, 
2011).  Therefore, even the use of overt safety behaviour, which have been theoretically 
proposed to be more problematic during exposure than distraction (e.g., Salkovskis, 1991), may 
not be as detrimental to treatment as was once hypothesized. 
Another important area of study that has emerged from the safety behaviour literature is 
that of treatment acceptability.  Specifically, research has shown that treatment descriptions that 
incorporate the use of safety behaviour in early stages of treatment are perceived as more 
acceptable by undergraduate (Levy, Senn, & Radomsky, 2014; Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013a) 
and clinically-anxious (Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013a) populations.  Furthermore, in an 
experimental study by Levy and Radomsky (2014), undergraduate participants rated an exposure 
session as a more acceptable treatment when they utilized safety behaviour compared to when 
they did not.  The results of Study 2 support the theory that the use of safety behaviour may 
increase treatment acceptability, as the use of moderate or high levels of distraction during 
exposure was associated with higher acceptability ratings.  Not only is it promising that the use 
of distraction techniques may increase treatment acceptability (especially given that these 
techniques were not found to interfere with exposure outcome), but this is also the first study to 
this author’s knowledge that has assessed this construct in the context of distraction use rather 
than safety behaviour more generally. 
Another promising finding from Study 2 was that increases in self-efficacy, although 
present across conditions, were significantly greater in the moderate distraction condition.  This 
is consistent with previous research showing greater increases in self-efficacy when comparing 
distraction use to focused distraction (e.g., Johnstone & Page, 2004).  The overall finding that 
self-efficacy increased following exposure supports Bandura’s (1977, 1988) self-efficacy theory 
that suggests that accomplishing difficult tasks will lead to a sense of mastery.  The results of 
Study 2 also support Bandura’s (1977, 1988) proposal that distraction may further aid in 
increasing self-efficacy due to reduced physiological arousal associated with distraction use.  
Specifically, in Study 2 the use of moderate levels of distraction led to the greatest increases in 
self-efficacy, and this distraction level was likely optimal due to (1) being somewhat distracting, 
(2) being a casual conversation that may aid in reducing physiological arousal, and (3) not being 





distraction condition).  Overall, the current results provide support for both self-efficacy theory 
and previous research in this area. 
Clinical Implications 
 Historically, distraction has frequently been discouraged in the context of exposure (e.g., 
Boschen, Neumann, & Waters, 2009; Clark et al., 2006; Foa & Kozak, 1986).  However, others 
have suggested that distraction use may not be detrimental to treatment outcome (e.g., Bandura, 
1977, 1988; Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; Salkovskis, 1991; Salkovskis, Clark, & Gelder, 
1996).  It has further been stated that the use of such techniques is often encouraged in clinical 
practice (e.g., Craske, Street, & Barlow, 1989; Salkovskis, 1991).  The results of the current 
research program present important considerations for clinical practice.  Firstly, results of Study 
2 indicate that distraction need not necessarily be discouraged in the context of exposure, as the 
use of such strategies did not have a negative impact on exposure outcome.  However, given 
smaller effect sizes for change in the high distraction condition, it is possible that distraction 
strategies that are highly taxing may be less ideal.  More research is necessary in order to clarify 
the potential impact of highly taxing tasks on exposure outcome, which may be an important 
consideration when selecting distraction tasks or discussing their use with clients.   
Although overall findings suggest that distraction does not impede progress in exposure, 
it may be important to consider whether or not an individual holds strong maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction.  Analyses related to the impact of BADI scores on exposure outcome revealed 
that strong maladaptive beliefs about distraction were related to less improvement when a 
moderate amount of distraction is utilized.  Therefore, decisions about whether to allow the use 
of distraction during exposure may depend in part on whether an individual feels that distraction 
is a necessary or useful strategy to cope with anxiety.  For these individuals, it may be ideal to 
target this belief directly, and potentially discourage the use of distraction during exposure.  
Given that targeting a broad range of maladaptive beliefs is an important component of CBT 
(e.g., Beck, 1976; Clark & Beck, 2010; Shafran, Brosan, & Cooper, 2013), being able to assess 
distraction-related beliefs using the BADI and understanding more about the impact of these 
beliefs on treatment outcome is clinically informative. 
The results of Study 2 also have important implications for clinical practice, given the 
observed acceptability-enhancing role of the use of distraction.  With high rates of treatment 





that methods to increase acceptability and willingness to complete treatment continue to be 
investigated.  Importantly, findings indicating that treatment outcome may not be impeded by 
safety behaviour use (e.g., Hood et al., 2010; Milosevic & Radomsky, 2008, 2013b; Rachman et 
al., 2011) or distraction use (e.g., Antony et al., 2001; Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1986; Oliver & 
Page, 2003, 2008), along with their use being associated with increased treatment acceptability 
(e.g., Levy & Radomsky, 2014), may provide an avenue by which to increase treatment 
engagement and client retention.  In the context of safety behaviour, it has been specifically 
suggested that the incorporation of these strategies in early stages of treatment may aid in 
reducing high rates of treatment drop-out and refusal (Parrish, Radomsky, & Dugas, 2008; 
Rachman, Radomsky, & Shafran, 2008).  The same theory may be relevant to the use of 
distraction during exposure.  Considering the results of Study 2, the use of distraction may not 
interfere with exposure outcome and enhances perceptions of treatment acceptability and 
willingness to adhere to and attend treatment.  Therefore, it may be useful to allow (and 
potentially even encourage) the use of distraction early in treatment, especially for individuals 
who are highly fearful about completing exposure; however, more research needs to be 
completed (including with clinical samples) before implementing these recommendations in 
clinical practice. 
Future Directions 
 While the results of this research program are informative, both replication and extension 
are necessary in order to confirm the current findings and expand upon potential clinical 
recommendations.  There are a number of potential directions that could be taken to replicate and 
expand on the findings of the current research program.  In terms of further development of the 
BADI presented in Study 1, validation of the revised BADI with a clinical and treatment-seeking 
sample would provide important information about the properties of this measure in a clinical 
sample.  Additionally, it would be helpful to see whether BADI scores (i.e., maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction) predict treatment outcome in clinical practice, as well as what impact these 
beliefs have on exposure when distraction is or is not utilized.  While the supplemental chapter in 
this research program presented data that aimed to begin to address this question, it was limited 
by the use of the original (i.e., unreduced) version of the BADI, and by a complex design that 
was assessing a separate research question.  A more direct comparison of individuals with high 





distracted and undistracted exposure would aid in clarifying the impact of these beliefs on 
exposure outcome. 
As previously mentioned, the observed relationship between maladaptive beliefs and 
lesser improvement during exposure was only evident in the moderate distraction condition; it is 
possible that the conversational task utilized in this condition exhibited strong similarities to 
typical distraction techniques used by individuals when anxious, and that this may have further 
contributed to reduced improvement.  In other words, using a distraction strategy that parallels 
that which an individual typically employs may strengthen their belief that distraction is 
necessary or effective, whereas this may not be the case if a different type of distraction task is 
utilized.  Indeed, a recent study showed that when individuals with contamination-related OCD 
used novel (or never-before-used) safety aids in an exposure session, (compared to safety aids 
that they use regularly in their day-to-day lives), improvement over the course of an exposure 
session was enhanced (Levy & Radomsky, under review).  Therefore, while maladaptive beliefs 
about distraction may be one important area of consideration, the specific type of distraction task 
utilized, and how this relates to typical use, may also be important.  Future studies should 
consider investigating the impact of using typical versus novel distraction tasks in the context of 
exposure. 
The focus of Study 2 was the impact of differing levels of distraction on exposure 
outcome.  While results indicated no significant differences in exposure outcome between 
conditions with no, low, moderate, and high distraction, the high distraction condition did not 
show as much improvement when within group effect sizes were evaluated.  Therefore, 
especially given design-related limitations, further research should aim to clarify the role of 
differing levels of distraction during exposure.  Importantly, researchers should continue to 
utilize experimentally validated distraction tasks to ensure that different levels of distraction are 
in fact achieved.  Furthermore, the impact of level of distraction on exposure outcome may be 
more robust in a clinical or treatment-seeking population. Therefore, it is important to test this 
hypothesis in the context of treatment, or at least with a clinical sample. 
Although two possible factors that may inform our understanding of the discrepant 
literature on distraction use during exposure were considered in the current research program, 
namely individual differences in maladaptive beliefs about distraction and the cognitive load 





attention.  Firstly, other individual differences such as personality characteristics or distress 
tolerance may be relevant to the impact of distraction on exposure.  Moreover, in addition to 
cognitive load, other distraction task properties may be important, such as personal relevance of 
the task, the individual’s interest in the task, and whether cognitive and/or visual attention are 
manipulated.  It is also possible that diverse outcomes may occur with different types or severity 
of anxiety.  Of course these factors only comprise a small number of potentially important 
aspects to consider, but it is clear that a number of questions remain unanswered. 
Finally, while the current research program focused on the impact of specific distraction-
related factors during exposure, it may be informative to investigate the impact of distraction use 
either prior to entering anxiety-provoking situations (i.e., when experiencing anticipatory 
anxiety) or following an anxiety-provoking situation when individuals may engage in post-event 
processing.  For example, recent research in the area of social anxiety has suggested that 
distraction, compared to anticipatory processing, prior to a speech task reduced both self-
reported and physiological symptoms of anxiety and also led to improved speech performance 
(Wong & Moulds, 2011), a finding that has been observed in additional studies (e.g., Hinrichsen 
& Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  Although these investigations focused on individuals with 
social anxiety, it may be useful to examine similar hypotheses with other forms of anxiety. 
In summary, although a number of studies have investigated distraction use during 
exposure, mixed findings have made it difficult to fully understand the role of distraction.  
Numerous factors may help explain these discrepant findings, and two potentially important 
factors have been described in the current research program.  The development of the BADI will 
allow for future investigations of the impact of maladaptive beliefs about distraction on exposure 
outcome, which may have important theoretical and clinical implications. Further research will 
allow for a more in depth understanding of the impact of these beliefs on treatment.  
Additionally, although the hypothesis that differing levels of cognitive load associated with 
distraction tasks would lead to differential treatment outcome was largely unsupported in Study 
2, further research should continue to evaluate this possibility through the use of a different 
experimental design and/or different types of distraction.  If other investigations elicit differences 
associated with varying levels of distraction this may be an important consideration in clinical 
practice.  Alternatively, if others similarly find that distraction level does not impact outcome, 





factors may be important to when, in what way, and for whom distraction use may be beneficial 
or detrimental, and further studies examining these factors would aid in gaining a more 
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Hierarchy of BAT Steps in Study 2 (Experiment 2) 
1. In room with toilet at furthest point away from the toilet (9 feet) 
2. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (8 feet away from toilet) 
3. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (7 feet away from toilet) 
4. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (6 feet away from toilet) 
5. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (5 feet away from toilet) 
6. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (4 feet away from toilet) 
7. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (3 feet away from toilet) 
8. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (2 feet away from toilet) 
9. Step onto the next closest line on the floor (1 foot away from toilet) 
10. Stand next to the toilet 
11. (Continue) looking into the toilet bowl 
12. Touch the top of the tank of the toilet with 1 finger and leave it there 
13. Touch the top of the tank of the toilet with 4 fingers and leave them there 
14. Touch the top of the tank with your whole hand (including palm) and leave it there 
15. Touch the top of the tank with two hands (including palms) and leave them there 
16. Rub your hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
17. Crouch down to look closely into the toilet bowl 
18. Touch the outside of the toilet bowl with 1 finger and leave it there 
19. Touch the outside of the toilet bowl with 4 fingers and leave them there 
20. Touch the outside of the toilet bowl with your whole hand (including palm) and leave it there 
21. Touch the outside of the toilet bowl with two hands (including palms) and leave them there 
22. Rub your hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
23. Touch the toilet seat with 1 finger and leave it there 
24. Touch the toilet seat with 4 fingers and leave them there 
25. Touch the toilet seat with your whole hand (including palm) and leave it there 
26. Touch the toilet seat with two hands (including palm) and leave them there 
27. Rub your hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
Lift the toilet seat up 
28. Touch the underside of the toilet seat with 1 finger and leave it there 
29. Touch the underside of the toilet seat with 4 fingers and leave them there 
30. Touch the underside of the toilet seat with your whole hand (including palm) and leave it 
there 
31. Touch the underside of the toilet seat with two hands (including palms) and leave them there 
32. Rub your hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
33. Touch the rim of the toilet bowl with 1 finger and leave it there 
34. Touch the rim of the toilet bowl with 4 fingers and leave them there 
35. Touch the rim of the toilet bowl with your whole hand (including palm) and leave it there 
36. Touch the rim of the toilet bowl with two hands (including palms) and leave them there 
37. Rub your hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
38. Touch the inside of the toilet bowl with 1 finger and leave it there 
39. Touch the inside of the toilet bowl with 4 fingers and leave them there 
40. Touch the inside of the toilet bowl with 4 fingers from each hand and leave them there 
41. Rub hands together in an intertwining fashion (like washing hands) 
42. Rub your hands all over your clothes 






43-Item Unrevised Beliefs about Distraction Inventory 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI) 
 
When people are anxious, they sometimes do certain things to help them cope with their anxiety. The 
questions below ask you to indicate how much you use distraction techniques when you are anxious. 
Distraction includes anything you might do to help you not to think about the situation or object 
that is making you anxious, such as imagining you are somewhere else, counting in your head, or 
having a conversation with someone. Before answering the questions below, please take a moment to 
reflect on the types of strategies you use to distract yourself when you are anxious. Please check off all 
the distraction techniques that apply to you in the following list: 
 
__ 
Think of something 
relaxing or calming 
__ 
 
Think about something 
insignificant like my grocery 
or to-do list 
__ Pray 
__ Read something __ 
Talk to someone (in person, 
on the phone, or by text) 
__ 
Use alcohol, drugs, or 
smoke cigarettes 
__ 
Think about something 
important to me, like the 
people I love or my 
favourite activity 
__ Count to myself __ 
Play games or listen to 
music 
__ Daydream __ 
Imagine that I am somewhere 
else 
__ Do breathing exercises 
__ 
 
Other (please describe): __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
When responding to the following questions, please consider situations in which you feel anxious, as well 
as the distraction techniques that you selected above. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree 
with each statement using the scale below. 
 
___      1                      2           _          3                        4               __     5         _            6                     7    
    disagree            disagree    disagree         neither agree           agree     agree              agree  
   very much       moderately      a little nor disagree      a little         moderately      very much 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1) I rely on distracting myself in order to 
reduce my anxiety 
       
2) If I distract myself, I can do things I 
would never be able to do otherwise 
       
3) Distracting myself is the only way to 
make it through an anxious situation 
       
4) If I were unable to distract myself, I 
would just leave the anxiety provoking 
situation I was in 





5) I often use distraction when I am 
anxious, but I don’t find it helpful 
       
6) I never distract myself        
7) Distracting myself helps me feel more 
comfortable when I’m anxious, but it isn’t 
really necessary to be able to make it 
through anxiety-provoking situations 
       
8) Distraction is useful for reducing my 
anxiety 
       
9) I always distract myself when I’m feeling 
anxious 
       
10) Without distraction, I wouldn’t be able to 
cope with anxiety 
       
11) It never occurs to me to distract myself 
when I’m anxious 
       
12) Even though I find distracting myself 
useful, I don’t feel like I need to do this to 
make it through difficult situations 
       
13) I don’t know of any better way to reduce 
my anxiety than using distraction 
       
14) If I don’t properly distract myself when 
I’m anxious, I may “lose it” completely 
       
15) Distraction is the only way I can get rid of 
anxiety 
       
16) I use distraction even in situations that 
only make me a little bit anxious 
       
17) I can’t understand why no matter how 
hard I try to distract myself it never 
makes my anxiety go away 
       
18) I feel most comfortable if I am able to 
distract myself when I am nervous 
       
19) Using distraction makes anxiety 
manageable 
       
20) I have to distract myself the entire time 
that I am in an anxiety-provoking 
situation for it to work 
       
21) If I am not able to distract myself when I 
am anxious, it is no big deal 
       
22) Distraction is not effective at all at getting 
rid of my anxiety 
       
23) I wish I could make it through difficult 
situations without needing to distract 
myself 
       
24) Feeling anxious is unbearable, so I always 
try to distract myself 
       
25) Distracting myself makes it easier for me 
to stay in anxiety-provoking situations 
       
26) I can cope with anxiety without needing 
distraction 





27) I use a lot of mental effort to focus on 
distracting myself when I’m anxious 
       
28) I constantly use distraction to feel less 
anxious 
       
29) If I don’t distract myself, there is no way 
I can make it through difficult situations 
       
30) The only time I really feel like I need to 
distract myself is when I am very anxious 
       
31) I usually make an effort not to distract 
myself when I’m anxious 
       
32) My anxiety overwhelms me if I don’t 
distract myself 
       
33) Distraction is useful, but if I can’t distract 
myself, I’ll still be fine 
       
34) If I can’t distract myself, I won’t be able 
to handle my anxiety 
       
35) I distract myself because I am less 
anxious if part of my mind is focused on 
something else 
       
36) Distraction helps me cope with my 
anxiety, but I would still be able to cope 
just fine without it 
       
37) When I know I’m going to be in an 
anxiety-provoking situation, I always 
prepare to distract myself 
       
38) Distraction helps me manage my anxiety        
39) I don’t feel the need to distract myself 
when I am anxious 
       
40) When I’m anxious, it’s helpful (but not 
necessary) if I can distract myself 
       
41) I distract myself every time that I am in 
an anxiety-provoking situation 
       
42) Distracting myself isn’t necessary – 
anxiety is manageable on its own 
       
43) When I am anxious, I am able to feel less 
anxious by distracting myself 
       
 












Final Version of the Beliefs about Distraction Inventory 
Beliefs about Distraction Inventory (BADI) 
 
When people are anxious, they sometimes do certain things to help them cope with their anxiety. The 
questions below ask you to indicate how much you use distraction techniques when you are anxious. 
Distraction includes anything you might do to help you not to think about the situation or object 
that is making you anxious, such as imagining you are somewhere else, counting in your head, or 
having a conversation with someone. Before answering the questions below, please take a moment to 
reflect on the types of strategies you use to distract yourself when you are anxious. Please check off all 
the distraction techniques that apply to you in the following list: 
 
__ 
Think of something 
relaxing or calming 
__ 
 
Think about something 
insignificant like my grocery 
or to-do list 
__ Pray 
__ Read something __ 
Talk to someone (in person, 
on the phone, or by text) 
__ 
Use alcohol, drugs, or 
smoke cigarettes 
__ 
Think about something 
important to me, like the 
people I love or my 
favourite activity 
__ Count to myself __ 
Play games or listen to 
music 
__ Daydream __ 
Imagine that I am somewhere 
else 
__ Do breathing exercises 
__ 
 
Other (please describe): __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
When responding to the following questions, please consider situations in which you feel anxious, as well 
as the distraction techniques that you selected above. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree 
with each statement using the scale below. 
 
___      1                      2           _          3                        4               __     5         _            6                     7    
    disagree            disagree    disagree         neither agree           agree     agree              agree  
   very much       moderately      a little nor disagree      a little         moderately      very much 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 I rely on distracting myself in order to reduce my 
anxiety 
       
2 Distracting myself is the only way to make it 
through an anxious situation 
       
3 Distraction is useful for reducing my anxiety        
4 I always distract myself when I’m feeling 
anxious 
       
5 Without distraction, I wouldn’t be able to cope 
with anxiety 





6 I don’t know of any better way to reduce my 
anxiety than using distraction 
       
7 If I don’t properly distract myself when I’m 
anxious, I may “lose it” completely 
       
8 Distraction is the only way I can get rid of 
anxiety 
       
9 I use distraction even in situations that only 
make me a little bit anxious 
       
10 Using distraction makes anxiety manageable        
11 I have to distract myself the entire time that I am 
in an anxiety-provoking situation for it to work 
       
12 I wish I could make it through difficult situations 
without needing to distract myself 
       
13 Feeling anxious is unbearable, so I always try to 
distract myself 
       
14 Distracting myself makes it easier for me to stay 
in anxiety-provoking situations 
       
15 I use a lot of mental effort to focus on distracting 
myself when I’m anxious 
       
16 I constantly use distraction to feel less anxious        
17 If I don’t distract myself, there is no way I can 
make it through difficult situations 
       
18 My anxiety overwhelms me if I don’t distract 
myself 
       
19 If I can’t distract myself, I won’t be able to 
handle my anxiety 
       
20 I distract myself because I am less anxious if part 
of my mind is focused on something else 
       
21 When I know I’m going to be in an anxiety-
provoking situation, I always prepare to distract 
myself 
       
22 Distraction helps me manage my anxiety        
23 I distract myself every time that I am in an 
anxiety-provoking situation 
       
24 When I am anxious, I am able to feel less 
anxious by distracting myself 

















“During the next portion of the study you will be asked to approach the toilet you just saw over a 
20 minute period, at your own pace. The reason I will be asking you to do this is because we 
know that one of the best ways to help people become less fearful is for them to confront their 
fears even when they feel anxious. What we typically see is that if people stay in the presence of 
something they fear for a prolonged period of time, their fear actually goes down. This is a well-
known and effective component of treatment for contamination fear, and every participant in this 
study will receive this effective treatment component. The purpose of this study is to try to better 
understand why and how this component works. Some theories state that it works because it 
makes you anxious, some say it works because it provides you with new information about the 
things you fear, and some theories state that it works by just being in the presence of the things 
you fear. As I mentioned, everyone will receive this effective component of treatment, but we are 
testing different ways of administering it based on the theories that I just mentioned. Do you 










































Study Consent Forms 
 




This is to state that I agree to participate in a research project being conducted by Jessica Senn 
(j_senn@live.concordia.ca; 514-848-2424 ext 5965) and Dr. Adam S. Radomsky 




This study aims to examine the use of different types of coping methods used by individuals 
during stressful situations. 
 
B. PROCEDURES 
If I agree to participate in this study, I will be asked to complete a questionnaire package. The 
package should take approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. These questionnaires ask no 
questions regarding my name and they will not be connected in any way with my contact details. 
I am aware that the data collected from these questionnaires will be hosted on a Concordia 
University server, but none of my identifying information will be linked to the questionnaires or 
hosted on the server. Finally, I will be fully debriefed about the purpose of the study as well as 
the hypotheses. For my participation, I will receive the opportunity to submit my name in a draw 
for cash prizes, OR course credit if I am part of the undergraduate participant pool at Concordia 
University. I am aware that this study employs a standardized protocol for which anxious and 
depressive symptoms are assessed. I will be provided access to a treatment resource manual 
containing information about self-help books and local treatment services. 
 
Following my participation, I may be re-contacted in approximately 4 weeks to complete a 
second set of questionnaires. These questionnaires will also be completed online using the 
Concordia server. I consent to being re-contacted about these questionnaires. 
 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this study 
at any time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that all information 
obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of 
seven years after which they will be shredded. Access to this information will be made available 
only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my name. I 
understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying information will 
be released. 
 





2424, ext. 5965. 
 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Jessica Senn, M.A., Graduate Student 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Office, Concordia University, at 514-848-2424, 



























Study 2 Experiment 1 Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN BALANCING ACT 
 
I understand that I have been asked to participate in a research project being conducted by Jessica Senn of 
the Department of Psychology, (j_senn@live.concordia.ca; 514-848-2424 x5965) for her doctoral 
dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Adam S. Radomsky of the Department of Psychology 




I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to test some tasks that will be used for future studies 




I understand that I am being asked to participate in this study and will first be asked to complete a 
computer-based task. I understand that I will then be asked to repeat this computer task while also 
completing a second task. I will then be asked to answer some questions about the tasks I completed and 
fill out some questionnaires on the computer. I understand that these questionnaires ask no questions 
regarding my name and they will not be connected in any way with my identifying information. I 
understand that I will next be asked to complete another task while in the presence of a potentially 
anxiety-provoking stimulus, and will be asked to complete some additional questionnaires. Finally, I 
understand that the hypotheses of the study will be fully explained and any questions I have will be 
addressed. I understand that the study should take approximately 60 minutes to complete, and will be 
audiotaped. For my participation, I understand that I will receive course credit through the Psychology 
Department Participant Pool, OR be entered in a draw for a chance to win a cash prize ranging from $50 
to $300. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
I understand that a potential risk of this study is that I may be asked to respond to questions of a sensitive 
nature (i.e., asking about symptoms of depression and anxiety), and that I may experience anxiety during 
the study. In the event of the unlikely occurrence of worsening of fear following the study, the researcher 
will offer treatment resources with no pressure or judgement. 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this study at any 
time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that my participation in this study is 
confidential (i.e., the researcher will know, but not disclose my identity). I understand that all information 
obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven 
years after which they will be shredded or destroyed. Access to this information will be made available 
only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my name. I 
understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying information will be 
released. 
 
If I have any questions concerning the study, I understand that I can ask the experimenter now. If other 
questions or concerns come up following the study, I understand that I am encouraged to contact the 






Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Jessica M. Senn, M.A., Doctoral Student 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________       AGE __________ 
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________      SEX   M / F 
 




I FURTHERMORE CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE THIS STUDY 
AUDIOTAPED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING STUDY INTEGRITY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________     
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________     
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE _______________________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance 






















Study 2 Experiment 1 Debriefing/Deception Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
As I have just been informed, the use of deceptive information was essential in this study in order to mimic a true 
anxiety-provoking stimulus. Thus, we used a toilet that was made to look as though it is contaminated even though it 
in fact is not.  
 
By signing below I indicate that I have been informed of this minor deception and allow the Anxiety and Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorders Laboratory to include my results in their analyses. Given the nature of this deception, I agree 









If I have any questions concerning this study, I will be sure to ask the researcher or call the lab at 514-848-2424, ext. 
5965. 
 
Adam Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor. 






















Study 2 Experiment 2 Consent Form – Undergraduate Participants 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN ‘LOOK OVER THERE!’ 
 
I understand that I have been asked to participate in a research project being conducted by Jessica Senn of 
the Department of Psychology, (j_senn@live.concordia.ca; 514-848-2424 x5965) for her doctoral 
dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Adam S. Radomsky of the Department of Psychology 




I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to test a component of treatment for contamination 
fear (i.e., an intense fear of objects or situations that are perceived as dirty or disgusting, or capable of 




I understand that I am being asked to participate in this study, and will be asked to attend two separate 
appointments in the lab. I understand that the first appointment will begin with a short assessment with 
the experimenter followed by some questionnaires. Next I will be asked to approach a contaminant as 
closely as I am able and provide ratings of my anxiety level. I understand that I will then spend 
approximately 15 minutes in the room with the contaminant and experimenter while following some 
specific instructions. This portion of the experiment will be audiotaped. Finally, I understand that I will be 
asked to complete some more questionnaires including those about my reactions to the previous task. I 
understand that the first visit should take approximately 2 hours, and I will receive 2 participant pool 
credits for participating. The second visit will take place one week after the first visit, and will involve 
completing more questionnaires and approaching a contaminant as closely as possible once again. I will 
also be asked to complete a short cognitive task. I understand that the second visit should take 
approximately 45-60 minutes, and that I will receive one additional participant pool credit for this visit. I 
understand that the questionnaires in this study ask no questions regarding my name and they will not be 
connected in any way with my identifying information. At the end of the second visit, the hypotheses of 
the study will be fully explained and any questions I have will be addressed. For my participation, I 
understand that I will receive course credit through the Psychology Department Participant Pool for each 
of the visits, OR be entered in a draw for a chance to win a cash prize ranging from $50 to $300. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
I understand that the potential risk of participation in this study is that I might become anxious or feel as 
though my fear is worse than it was when I arrived. In the event of the unlikely occurrence of worsening 
of fear, the researcher will offer treatment resources with no pressure or judgement. I understand that 
benefits of participation will be to receive a short treatment component related to my fear. 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this study at any 
time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that my participation in this study is 
confidential (i.e., the researcher will know, but not disclose my identity). I understand that all information 
obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven 





only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my name. I 
understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying information will be 
released. 
 
If I have any questions concerning the study, I understand that I can ask the experimenter now. If other 
questions or concerns come up following the study, I understand that I am encouraged to contact the 
Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders laboratory at (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Jessica M. Senn, M.A., Doctoral Student 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________       AGE __________ 
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________      SEX   M / F 
 





I FURTHERMORE CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE THIS STUDY 
AUDIOTAPED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING STUDY INTEGRITY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________     
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________     
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE _______________________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance 















Study 2 Experiment 2 Consent Form – Paid Participants 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN ‘LOOK OVER THERE!’ 
 
I understand that I have been asked to participate in a research project being conducted by Jessica Senn of 
the Department of Psychology, (j_senn@live.concordia.ca; 514-848-2424 x5965) for her doctoral 
dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Adam S. Radomsky of the Department of Psychology 




I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to test a component of treatment for contamination 
fear (i.e., an intense fear of objects or situations that are perceived as dirty or disgusting, or capable of 




I understand that I am being asked to participate in this study, which will consist of one or two separate 
appointments in the lab. I understand that at the first visit I will find out whether or not I am eligible to 
continue to the study and attend the second visit. I understand that the first appointment will begin with a 
short assessment with the experimenter followed by some questionnaires. Next I will be asked to 
approach a contaminant as closely as I am able and provide ratings of my anxiety level. I understand that I 
will then spend approximately 20 minutes in the room with the contaminant and experimenter while 
following some specific instructions. This portion of the experiment will be audiotaped. Finally, I 
understand that I will be asked to complete some more questionnaires including those about my reactions 
to the previous task. I understand that the first visit should take approximately one hour and 45 minutes 
(or approximately one hour if I am not eligible to continue). The second visit will take place one week 
after the first visit, and will involve completing more questionnaires and approaching a contaminant as 
closely as possible once again. I will also be asked to complete a short cognitive task. I understand that 
the second visit should take approximately 45-60 minutes. I understand that the questionnaires in this 
study ask no questions regarding my name and they will not be connected in any way with my identifying 
information. At the end of the second visit, the hypotheses of the study will be fully explained and any 
questions I have will be addressed. 
 
If I am eligible to continue the study, I will be paid $30 at the end of my second visit. If I am not eligible 
to continue, I will receive $10 for attending the first visit, and my second visit will be cancelled.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
I understand that the potential risk of participation in this study is that I might become anxious or feel as 
though my fear is worse than it was when I arrived. In the event of the unlikely occurrence of worsening 
of fear, the researcher will offer treatment resources with no pressure or judgement. I understand that 
benefits of participation will be to receive a short treatment component related to my fear. 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this study at any 
time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that my participation in this study is 





obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven 
years after which they will be shredded or destroyed. Access to this information will be made available 
only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team. I understand that to ensure my 
confidentiality all data will be coded by number only and will be kept separate from my name. I 
understand that data from this study may be published, but that no identifying information will be 
released. 
 
If I have any questions concerning the study, I understand that I can ask the experimenter now. If other 
questions or concerns come up following the study, I understand that I am encouraged to contact the 
Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders laboratory at (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Professor 
Jessica M. Senn, M.A., Doctoral Student 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________       AGE __________ 
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________      SEX   M / F 
 





I FURTHERMORE CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE THIS STUDY 
AUDIOTAPED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING STUDY INTEGRITY. 
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________     
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE _______________________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance 















Study 2 Experiment 2 Debriefing/Deception Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
As I have just been informed, the use of deceptive information was essential in this study in 
order to mimic a true anxiety-provoking stimulus. Thus, we used a toilet that was made to look 
as though it is contaminated even though it in fact is not.   
 
By signing below I indicate that I have been informed of this minor deception and allow the 
Anxiety and Obsessive Compulsive Disorders Laboratory to include my results in their analyses. 
Given the nature of this deception, I agree to refrain from talking about the specific details of this 









If you have any questions concerning this study, please feel free to ask the researcher or call the 
lab at 514-848-2424, ext. 5965. 
 
Adam Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor. 
Jessica Senn, M.A., Doctoral Student 
 
